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TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES: EXPANDING
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR
THE DEFECTIVE PRICING OF
GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS
W Bruce Shirk,* Bennett D. Greenberg,** and William S. Dawson II"***
In 1984, two of the authors published an article describing the civil and
criminal liability that government contractors face if they submit defective
cost or pricing data to the federal government.' The article focussed on the
relationship between the Truth in Negotiations Act (the Act) and the false
claims statutes, and noted that the federal government's intensified cam-
paign to curb waste, fraud, and abuse in federal procurements had placed
government contractors in an extremely vulnerable position in the procure-
ment process.2 More specifically, it examined how contractors could be-
come entangled in a web of civil and criminal liability by submitting cost or
pricing data that were not accurate, complete, and current in price negotia-
tions with the government.3
Events in the four years since publication of that article have both con-
firmed the vulnerability of government contractors to the web of civil and
criminal liability for defective pricing and significantly expanded the scope of
that liability. Two converging trends in law enforcement have accelerated
the process. First, the war against fraud, waste, and abuse in defense con-
tracting continues unabated as major enactments and regulations are passed
on a yearly basis, expanding the weapons in the government's already formi-
dable antifraud arsenal. The recently publicized nationwide FBI and Naval
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1. Shirk & Greenberg, An Analysis of the Web of Civil and Criminal Liability for Defec-
tive Pricing of Government Contracts, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 319, 321-45 (1984).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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Investigative Service probe into fraud in Department of Defense (DoD) con-
tracting assures the acceleration of the war on fraud for the foreseeable fu-
ture.4 Second, a general expansion of corporate criminal liability has
emerged, as exemplified by the recent proliferation of corporate criminal leg-
islation.5 Eight recent developments exemplify these trends.
First, Congress has amended the Truth in Negotiations Act6 to codify
existing case law holding that liability for defective cost or pricing data is not
contingent upon a certification of the data by the contractor.7 The amend-
ment also defines the term "cost or pricing data" in an expansive manner,8
and provides for double damages in defense contract cases where the con-
tractor knew that the data was defective.9
Second, Congress has virtually rewritten the civil false claims statute.10
The amended statute increases damages and penalties recoverable by the
government, expands the definition of "claims," eases the government's bur-
den of proof, and broadens and relaxes the standard applicable to proof of a
4. See Grand Jury Hearings on Defense Fraud Probe Set for July 19, 50 Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) 164 (July 18, 1988); Pentagon Stops Payment on Tainted Contracts, Begins Suspension
Actions, 50 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 97 (July 11, 1988); Aspin Urges "Dramatic Move" by DOD
to Curb Fraud, Suggests Contract Freeze, 50 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 3 (July 4, 1988); Four
More Search Warrants Issued in FBI, Navy Fraud Probe, 49 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 1246
(June 27, 1988); FBI, Navy Search Defense Contractors, Pentagon Offices, 49 Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) 1209 (June 20, 1988); Affidavits for Warrants to Search Offices of Joe Bradley of
Varian Continental and Consultant Mark Saunders (June 1988), reprinted in 50 Fed. Cont.
Rep. (BNA) 120 (July 11, 1988); Memorandum from June Gibbs, Inspector General, to Secre-
tary of Defense, Frank Carlucci (June 1, 1988), reprinted in 50 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 75
(July 4, 1988); Warrant Authorizing Search of McDonnell Douglas Vice President Thomas
Gunn's Office (undated), reprinted in 49 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 1234 (June 20, 1988); War-
rant to Search Residence of Consultant Melvyn Paisley (undated), reprinted in 50 Fed. Cont.
Rep. (BNA) 180 (July 18, 1988).
5. See, e.g., Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat.
1264 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 78u (Supp. IV 1986)); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of title 18
U.S.C.); Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
646, § 59, 100 Stat. 3592 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 666 (Supp. IV 1986)); Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. I, § 1352(a), 100 Stat. 3207-18 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 981 (Supp. IV 1986)); Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596,
98 Stat. 3134 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3611 (Supp. IV 1986)); False Claims Amendments Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3701 (Supp. IV 1986)); Anti-
Kickback Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-634, 100 Stat. 3523 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 51-58 (Supp. IV 1986)).
6. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a), 2304(a)(14), 2304(g), 2306(a), 2306(f), 2310(b), 2311 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
7. Id. § 2306a(d).
8. Id. § 2306a(g).
9. Id. § 2306a(e)(1)(B).
10. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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civil false claim." The statute also protects whistle blowers and authorizes
private parties to institute qui tam suits on behalf of the government.'
2
Third, the newly enacted Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act,13 a "mini-
False Claims Act," has created an administrative process for the adjudica-
tion of smaller program fraud cases (up to $150,000 damages) before an ad-
ministrative law judge.' 4 The statute encompasses false statements as well as
false claims.' 5
Fourth, the government is increasingly prosecuting contractors, who have
defectively priced contracts, for criminal false claims or false statements16
Moreover, recent federal criminal legislation has increased dramatically the
maximum fines courts may impose on both individuals and corporations
convicted of criminal false claims or false statements and has instituted
guidelines mandating increased minimum sentences and fines. 7
The fifth development is found in recent case law, potentially applicable to
government contractors in criminal fraud cases, that has raised potential
corporate criminal liability to an unprecedented level through the use of the
collective knowledge doctrine.'" Sixth, the power of the DoD Inspector
General to issue investigative subpoenas has been expanded. That power
now includes the authority to issue investigative subpoenas to further Justice
Department probes.' 9
The seventh development is the advent of the Voluntary Disclosure Pro-
gram, through which contractors are encouraged to voluntarily disclose cor-
porate transgressions, such as cases of defective pricing.2" This program
gives contractors an additional impetus to monitor their estimating and pric-
ing processes as a fraud prevention measure, but does not guarantee that
disclosed violations will not be prosecuted. 2'
11. Id. §§ 3731(b)-(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
12. Id. § 3730(b).
13. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3810 (Supp. IV 1986).
14. Id. § 3803.
15. Id. § 3802.
16. See, e.g., United States v. White, 765 F.2d 1469 (1 1th Cir. 1985); United States v. JT
Constr. Co., 668 F. Supp. 592 (W.D. Tex. 1987); United States v. DiBona, 614 F. Supp. 40
(E.D. Pa. 1984).
17. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 200, 98
Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); Criminal Fine Enforcement
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, § 10, 98 Stat. 3134 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3611 (Supp. IV
1986)); Criminal Fines Improvements Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3571-3574 (West Supp. 1988)).
18. United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 328 (1987).
19. United States v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 831 F.2d 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
20. 47 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 303 (Feb. 23, 1987).
21. Id.
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Finally, the United States House of Representatives recently passed legis-
lation entitled the Major Fraud Act of 1988 (H.R. 3911) that would create a
new criminal offense of "procurement fraud," applicable to government con-
tract frauds of more than $1 million.22 The bill's provisions contain a seven-
year statute of limitations and, upon conviction, impose fines of up to double
the amount of the contract (up to a $10 million maximum) and imprison-
ment of up to ten years.23 Additionally, the bill includes "bounty hunter"
rewards that allow individuals whose testimony leads to a procurement
fraud conviction to share in a percentage of the fines levied against the con-
tractor, up to a $250,000 maximum."
The foregoing examples demonstrate a very significant expansion of the
government-wide campaign against fraud, waste, and abuse. Although this
campaign is directed at the entire range of the government acquisition
processes from pre-award stage to completion or termination of perform-
ance, one of the most important areas of concern is contract pricing. Indeed,
DoD considers contract pricing a critical area of the overall campaign.
Thus, a major section of the DoD Inspector General's "red book," entitled
Indicators of Fraud in Department of Defense Procurement, and issued in
June 1984, is devoted exclusively to the opportunities for fraud in contract
pricing.25
Similarly, in December 1986, the DoD Inspector General issued his
Handbook on Scenarios of Potential Defective Pricing Fraud, which empha-
sizes that government auditors should "think fraud" when conducting a
postaward review and should regard defective pricing, when identified, as an
"indicator of fraud."'2 6 In June 1988, the DoD Inspector General issued a
report entitled Criminal Defective Pricing and the Truth in Negotiations Act,
which called for the use of a variety of remedies, not merely recovery under
the Truth in Negotiations Act, to combat fraud in defective pricing.27 The
report analyzed several recent criminal cases of defective pricing and stated
that the "confirmed existence of one or more of the [fraud] indicators [listed
in the December 1986 Handbook] will often pave the way towards establish-
ing the requisite scienter for criminal or civil liability." 8 The report con-
cluded that "[t]he problem of defective pricing is more pernicious today than
22. House Passes Procurement Fraud Bill, 49 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 957 (May 16, 1988).
23. Id.
24. Id. However, persons who could have prevented the fraud by disclosing it to their
employer or who actively participated in the fraud would be ineligible for the rewards. Id.
25. Inspector General, Dep't of Defense Pub. No. IG/DOD 4075.1-H.
26. Inspector General, Dep't of Defense Pub. No. IG/APO 7600.1-H.
27. Defense IG Highlights Indicators of Criminal Defective Pricing, 49 Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) 1113 (June 6, 1988).
28. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, IGDPH 4200.50,
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ever, despite legislative attempts to curb its magnitude."29
As recently as August 9, 1988, the front page of the New York Times
disclosed a "confidential report" by the DoD Inspector General and the De-
fense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) that described a "comprehensive au-
dit" over the past four years of "774 pricing actions" on contracts held by
ninety-five contractors.3 0 The report concluded that "overpricing was a re-
current problem for the 95 contractors" and that "365 (47.2%) [of their
pricing actions] were overpriced."'', The report noted that the DCAA "has
increased defective pricing audits to the point that they consume seven per-
cent of its budget" and the inspectors who conducted the audit referred
twenty-nine contracts involving twenty-four suppliers to federal investiga-
tors "because of potential contractor fraud.",32 Thus, defective pricing is
closely related to the entire postaward audit process, which today is one of
the principal sources of fraud allegations against government contractors.
Moreover, the government is inclined to prosecute defective pricing cases
because of the potential for recovery of substantial sums of money.
These developments have placed government contractors in an extremely
vulnerable and precarious position in the procurement process. A defect or
omission in cost or pricing data, even if minor and unintentional, can lead to
a massive fraud investigation and entanglement in an expanding web of civil
and criminal liability, with potentially serious consequences for both the
contractor and individual employees involved.
This Article reexamines the government contractor's potential liability for
defective pricing in light of the recent developments in the law. Part I exam-
ines the recently amended Truth in Negotiations Act, with particular em-
phasis on the submission requirements for cost or pricing data, the elements
constituting a prima facie violation of the Act, and government recovery
under the Act. Part II discusses the newly amended civil false claims stat-
ute, focusing in particular on the significant changes that expand contractor
liability and the government's recovery for a violation of the statute. Part II
also examines the newly enacted program fraud civil remedies statute, other-
wise known as the "Mini-False Claims Act."
Part III of this Article reviews the elements of a prima facie violation of
CRIMINAL DEFECTIVE PRICING AND THE TRUTH IN NEGOTIATIONS ACT (1988) (citing ex-
cerpts reprinted in 49 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 1163, 1164 (June 6, 1988)).
29. Defense IG Highlights Indicators of Criminal Defective Pricing, 49 Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) at 1113.
30. Cushman, Review of Pentagon's Contracts Finds Overcharges are Common, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
31. Id.
32. Id. at A13, col. 1.
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the criminal false statements and false claims statutes, emphasizing the elim-
ination of the requirement to prove specific intent to defraud the government
and the significantly increased penalties upon conviction. Part III also dis-
cusses the impact of the recent "collective knowledge" doctrine on corporate
liability for criminal false claims and false statements. Finally, Part IV uses
hypotheticals to analyze the contractor's expanded liability for defective
pricing and fraud, and highlights the inevitable erosion of the distinction
between defective pricing and fraud resulting from that expanded liability.
I. THE OPERATION OF THE TRUTH IN NEGOTIATIONS ACT
In procurements using other than sealed bid procedures, 33 the Truth in
Negotiations Act requires a government contractor to submit cost or pricing
data and to certify that such data are accurate, complete, and current as of
the date that the contractor and the government reach agreement on price.a4
Negotiated defense and civilian prime contracts, subcontracts, and modifica-
tions to any federal contracts that exceed $100,000, fall under the Act.3"
Contractors may be exempted from the Act's requirements if their prices are
based on adequate price competition, established catalog or market prices, or
set by law.3 6
Congress passed the original Truth in Negotiations Act to eliminate over-
pricing in the negotiation of noncompetitive defense contracts. a7 Congress
33. The sealed bidding method of contracting employs solicitation of competitive bids,
public opening of bids, evaluation of bids without discussions with bidders, and award based
only on price and price-related factors. 48 C.F.R. § 14.101 (1987). Contracts that are not
sealed bid contracts are negotiated contracts, meaning "contracting through the use of either
competitive or other-than-competitive proposals and discussions." 48 C.F.R. § 15.101 (1987).
34. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a (Supp. IV 1986); In the 1986 Continuing Appropriations Act, Con-
gress amended and recodified the Truth in Negotiations Act from 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (Supp.
IV 1986). The amendment provided that:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), section 2306a of title 10, United States
Code (as added by subsection (a)), and the amendment [of section 2306(f) of title 10,
U.S.C.] and repeal made by subsection (b), shall apply with respect to contracts or
modifications on contracts entered into after the end of the 120-day period beginning
on the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 18, 1986].
(2) Subsection (e) of such section [section 2306(c) of title 10, U.S.C.] shall apply
with respect to contracts or modifications on contracts entered into after November
7, 1985.
Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 101(c), 100 Stat. 1783-169 (1986).
35. Prior to 1986, the Truth in Negotiations Act did not govern contracts with civilian
agencies, but the agencies nonetheless adopted the Act's procedures as reflected in the Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FAR). The 1986 amendments applied the Act to all civilian agencies
as codified at 41 U.S.C. § 254 (Supp. IV 1986). Also, the certification threshold was reduced
from $500,000 to $100,000 in the 1986 amendments. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(j) (Supp. IV 1986).
36. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
37. See Shirk & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 323.
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perceived that the failure of contractors to disclose complete, current, and
accurate cost and pricing data during the negotiations of defense contracts
left the government in a weak negotiating position, thereby enabling the con-
tractors to obtain inflated prices for their supplies or services.38
The Truth in Negotiations Act and its implementing regulatory provi-
sions, as set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),39 attempt to
correct the perceived imbalance in negotiation strength by requiring a gov-
ernment contractor to submit cost or pricing data' with its proposal in a
negotiated procurement exceeding $100,000. 4' The contractor also must
certify that the submitted cost or pricing data is "accurate, complete and
current" as of the date a price agreement is reached with the government.42
Should the contractor's submitted data be inaccurate, incomplete, or out-
dated, the government may bring a defective pricing action against the con-
tractor for a reduction in the contract price equal to the amount that the
contract has been overpriced, including profit or fee.43
38. The Senate Report stated:
In determining the price under many types of negotiated contracts the Govern-
ment must rely, at least in part, on cost and pricing data submitted by the contractor
or his subcontractor. In recent years the General Accounting Office submitted several
reports to the Congress on cases in which contractors received unwarranted profits be-
cause the data used in establishing target costs or prices were inaccurate, incomplete, or
out of date. Although many of these reports were on incentive contracts, the objec-
tive of avoiding enhanced profits through failure to inform the contracting agency of
the most current, accurate, and complete cost data is equally desirable in other types
of negotiated contracts.
S. REP. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2476, 2477 (emphasis added).
39. 48 C.F.R. §§ 1-53 (1987).
40. Id. § 15.804-6(b). Contractors must submit cost or pricing data on Standard Form
1411. U.S. Government Printing Office, Standard Form 1411, Contract Pricing Proposal
Sheet (1984); 48 C.F.R. § 53.301-141 1 (1987). This form took the place of the old Depart-
ment of Defense Form 633.
41. 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-8(a), (b) (1987). The Act also applies to the modification of any
formally advertised or negotiated contract involving a price adjustment exceeding $100,000,
the award of a subcontract exceeding $100,000 if the prime contractor and each higher tier
subcontractor have been required to submit data, or the modification of a subcontract involv-
ing a price adjustment exceeding $100,000 if the original subcontract exceeded $100,000. 10
U.S.C. § 2306a(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
42. 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-4 (1987) sets forth the certificate the contractor must execute
when price negotiations are concluded and the contract price is agreed to.
43. 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-7(b) (1987) provides in pertinent part:
If, after award, cost or pricing data are found to be inaccurate, incomplete, or
noncurrent as of the date of final agreement on price given on the contractor's ...
Certificate of Current Cost of Pricing Data, the Government is entitled to a price
adjustment, including profit or fee, of any significant amount by which the price was
increased because of the defective data.
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A. Determining If Submission of Cost or Pricing Data Is Required:
Exemptions from the Truth in Negotiations Act Requirements
The Truth in Negotiations Act and the FAR provisions recognize that
there are certain procurement situations in which the government does not
require special protection against overpricing. Thus, where there is adequate
price competition for a contract, 44 the price is set by law or regulation,4 5 or
the price is established in a catalog or by market price for a commercial
46item, a contractor may qualify for an exemption to the Act.
Adequate price competition exists for a particular solicitation when the
contracting officer determines that the following criteria have been met:
(1) offers are solicited; (2) two or more responsible offerors that can satisfy
the government's requirements submit priced offers responsive to the express
requirements of the solicitation; and (3) these offerors compete indepen-
dently for a contract to be awarded to the responsible offeror submitting the
lowest evaluated price. 7
The contracting officer also has significant discretion in granting thep "cat-
alog or market price" exemption. This exemption applies to contracts priced
according to "established catalog or market prices of commercial items, sold
in substantial quantities to the general public.' 8 To qualify for this exemp-
tion, a contractor must offer either an "established catalog price" or an "es-
tablished market price." The former is a price that is maintained on a
regular, published, or publicly available schedule and a price at which signif-
icant sales have been made. 4'9 The latter is a price set in the ordinary course
of trade between free buyers and sellers capable of verification from sources
independent of the manufacturer or vendor, such as from a trade publica-
tion.5° The item offered at the established catalog or market price must be a
For a more detailed discussion of the government's recovery in a case of defective pricing, see
infra notes 125-49 and accompanying text.
44. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(b)(l)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
45. Id. § 2306a(b)(l)(C).
46. Id. § 2306a(b)(l)(B).
47. 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-3(b)(1) (1987). The regulation states that the contracting officer
"shall presume" that adequate price competition exists if the three criteria are met unless:
(i) The solicitation is made under conditions that unreasonably deny to one or
more known and qualified offerors an opportunity to compete;
(ii) [t]he low offeror has such a decided advantage that it is practically immune
from competition; or
(iii) [t]here is a finding, supported by a statement of the facts and approved at a
level above the contracting officer, that the lowest price is unreasonable.
Id. § 15.804-3(b)(2).
48. Id. § 15.804-3(c).
49. Id. § 15.804-3(c)(1).
50. Id. § 15.804-3(c)(2).
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"commercial item," meaning an item sold to the general public in the nor-
mal course of business, as opposed to one specially made for the govern-
ment. 5' Finally, the offered item must be sold to the general public in
"substantial quantities," meaning that commercial sales must be adequate to
establish a real commercial market.52 In exceptional cases the chief of an
agency's contracting office has the power to authorize individual or class
exemptions on the contracting officer's recommendation even though the
priced item does not strictly meet all the criteria for the catalog or market
price exemption.53
A contractor also may qualify for an exemption from the Truth in Negoti-
ations Act where prices for an offered product or service are set by law or
regulation. Qualification for this exemption requires that the price be set by
a governmental body.54 For example, utility rates set by law would qualify
under this exemption.
Finally, the Truth in Negotiations Act provides that the head of a procur-
ing agency or his delegee may authorize waivers of the cost or pricing data
requirements.55 A secretarial waiver, however, is very rarely granted. 56
B. Definition of "Cost or Pricing Data"
Although Congress enacted the Truth in Negotiations Act twenty-six
years ago,57 Congress did not define the term "cost or pricing data" until the
Act was amended in 1986.58 Congress took that definition almost verbatim
from the FAR. 59 The inadequacy of the definition has spawned further at-
tempts by Congress and the judiciary to clarify the definition of cost or pric-
ing data.6° Those efforts, however, have only served to further blur the
distinction between what is and what is not cost or pricing data. The issue is
not yet resolved.
The failure to establish a "bright-line" definition of cost or pricing data
has created a serious problem for contractors, especially in light of the gov-
51. Id. § 15.804-3(c)(3).
52. Id. § 15.804-3(c)(4).
53. Id. § 15.804-3(g).
54. Id. § 15.804-3(c).
55. Id.; 10 U.S.C. § 2311 (Supp. IV 1986).
56. The Comptroller General has held that a waiver cannot be given to only one of several
offerors on a contract since unequal competition would be the result. 46 Comp. Gen. 631
(1967).
57. Armed Services Procurement Act, Pub. L. No. 87-653, 76 Stat. 528 (1962) (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (1982)).
58. Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 101(c),
100 Stat. 1783-169 (1986) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(g) (Supp. IV 1986)).
59. 48 C.F.R. § 15.801 (1987).
60. See infra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
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ernment's intensified scrutiny of contractor cost or pricing data submissions.
Contractors are confronted with the dilemma of either disclosing to the gov-
ernment more data than is actually required in order to assure compliance,
or withholding questionable data and risking charges of defective pricing or
massive fraud investigations.
Prior to the 1986 amendments to the Truth in Negotiations Act, the FAR
defined "cost or pricing data" as all facts existing up to the time of agree-
ment on price that prudent buyers and sellers would reasonably expect to
have a significant effect on price negotiations. 61 Contractors generally un-
derstood that this definition of cost or pricing data embraced more than his-
torical accounting data. It was further understood that the term "facts"
referred to in the definition meant factual data capable of being verified.
Historically, litigation on the matter centered around the distinction between
factual data, which were required to be disclosed, and judgmental data such
as business judgments or estimates, which were not required to be
disclosed.62
Pressure from both administrative agencies and contractors for a more
precise description of cost or pricing data, coupled with the government's
widespread focus on contractor pricing practices, spurred Congress to at-
tempt to clarify the definition in its 1986 amendments to the Truth in Nego-
tiations Act. The amendments define "cost or pricing data" as "all
information that is verifiable and that, as of the date of agreement on the
price of a contract ... a prudent buyer or seller would reasonably expect to
affect price negotiations significantly." 63 Later in 1986, Congress modified
the definition by inserting "[s]uch term does not include information that is
judgmental, but does include the actual information from which a judgment
was derived. '"64 This attempt at clarification only complicated matters, how-
ever, due to the practical difficulty in separating pure judgmental data from
the factual data upon which the judgments are based.
Texas Instruments, Inc. 6- illustrates the practical difficulty in separating
facts and judgments. During negotiations for a radar systems contract, the
61. 48 C.F.R. § 15.807-1(a) (1983).
62. See E-Systems, Inc., ASBCA No. 17,557, 74-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,943 (1974); LTV
Electrosystems, Inc., ASBCA No. 16,802, 73-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 9957, reconsid. denied, 74-1
B.C.A. (CCH) 110,380 (1973); Sylvania Elec. Prods., ASBCA No. 13,622, 70-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
$ 8387 (1970); Aerojet-General Corp., ASBCA No. 12,264, 69-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 7664, modi-
fied, 70-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 8140 (1970); American Bosch Anna Corp., ASBCA No. 10,305, 65-
2 B.C.A. (CCH) $ 5280 (1965).
63. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(g) (Supp. IV 1986).
64. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 952,
100 Stat. 3948 (1986).
65. ASBCA No. 23,678, 87-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,195 (1987).
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contractor furnished the government with detailed job order cost reports,
project account summaries, and learning curve projections, as well as two
computer generated "run cost" reports.6 6 The second run cost report (Run
Cost 2) incorporated system parts costs into a total estimated cost for a hy-
67pothetical radar system. Run Cost 2 also presented a slice of the system
cost history picture at a particular time in the production cycle of a product
line and was an essential judgmental step in plotting the learning curve slope
for estimating future production costs. 68 The government contended that
Run Cost 2 was defective factual cost or pricing data because it did not
include "later accumulated and more current costs."' 69 The contractor
countered that Run Cost 2 was not cost or pricing data, because of the judg-
mental nature of the unit values therein, and was useful only as a learning
curve estimate.7°
In addressing the issue, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA) noted the difficulty in applying the Truth in Negotiations Act to
computer generated reports and models increasingly used by contractors "to
ascertain [cost] trends, plot learning curves, [and] estimate future production
costs."'7 1 Such reports invariably contain both verifiable factual data and
elements of judgment in their content and in the manner in which they are
prepared. 72 The ASBCA concluded that it "may be impossible to incorpo-
rate into a single computer generated document the three requirements of
the... Act with regard to the accuracy, completeness, and currency of that
document. , 7 3
Based on an extensive review of the FAR and case law, the ASBCA con-
cluded that the key issue was not whether the documents or information in
dispute constituted "cost or pricing data":
Rather, we believe there were two real issues in these types of cases
that are often assumed but not articulated. The first was the issue
of the scope of the certificate of accuracy, completeness and cur-
rency .... [I]t is possible, as in the instant appeal ... that a single
document may not contain all of the cost or pricing data covered
by the certificate, and that such a document contains both "cost or
pricing data" and information of a judgmental nature which is not
cost or pricing data. The second issue relates to whether the data
66. Id. at 102,225-26.
67. Id. at 102,275.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 102,263.
70. Id. at 102,264.
71. Id. at 102,268.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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in dispute were disclosed to the Government in a meaningful man-
ner so that the Government was aware of their significance to the
74negotiation process ....
In Texas Instruments, Inc., the ASBCA resolved these issues by holding
that Run Cost 2 was cost or pricing data, "notwithstanding the fact that it
was generated judgmentally and that it contained elements of judgment and
estimates. ' ,7 5 The contractor's submission of Run Cost 2 "served as a means
for meaningfully disclosing the cost or pricing data" represented therein and
it followed that Run Cost 2, together with the contractor's other data sub-
missions, "placed the [government] in a position equal to appellant with re-
spect to making judgments on pricing."'76  Furthermore, the ASBCA
explained that Run Cost 2 was not defective data because it was the best
data of its type available at the time of agreement on price, the contractor
was not liable for judgmental errors therein, and the requirements of accu-
racy, completeness, and currency were not to be applied to that report in
isolation from the contractor's other data submissions.77
While the ASBCA wrestled with this issue, Congress made yet another
attempt to clarify the definition of "cost or pricing data."'7' Although the
latest amendment essentially left the definition intact, the phrase "all infor-
mation that is verifiable" was replaced with the words "all facts." Thus, the
current statutory definition of cost or pricing data reads as follows:
Cost or pricing data defined. -In this section, the term "cost or
pricing data" means all facts that, as of the date of agreement on
the price of a contract (or the price of a contract modification), a
prudent buyer or seller would reasonably expect to affect price ne-
gotiations significantly. Such term does not include information
that is judgmental, but does include the factual information from
which a judgment was derived.79
The legislative history, however, indicates that Congress' definition of
"cost or pricing data" is similar to that espoused in Texas Instruments,
Inc. 80 The House and Senate conferees on the measure desired "to reaffirm
that 'cost or pricing data' should be broadly construed to include all facts
that a prudent buyer or seller would reasonably expect to affect price negoti-
74. Id. at 102,274.
75. Id. at 102,276.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No.
100-180, § 804, 101 Stat. 1125 (1987) (codified at 10 U.S.C.A. § 2306a(g) (West Supp. 1988)).
79. 10 U.S.C.A. § 2306a(g) (West Supp. 1988).
80. ASBCA No. 23,678, 87-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,195, at 102,273 (1987).
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ations significantly."' 81 The conferees noted that the definition was drawn
directly from the FAR, and further acknowledged that "cost or pricing
data" must in some instances include information that would be considered
judgmental. 82 For example, facts and data may be so intertwined with judg-
ments that the judgments must be disclosed in order to make the facts or
data meaningful.83
Another defining characteristic of cost or pricing data is its significant
effect on price negotiations. The Truth in Negotiations Act does not require
submission of data that "a prudent buyer or seller" would not reasonably
expect to "affect price negotiations significantly." 84 The disclosure require-
ments, however, extend beyond data actually relied upon by the contractor
to data that a prudent offeror would consider relevant in estimating its
cost.
85
Finally, the definition of cost or pricing data excludes significant data not
reasonably available before the "date of agreement on price" by the par-
ties.86 Conversely, data submitted must be current as of the time of price
agreement, and contractors have a continuing obligation to update their data
submissions until that time.87
Prior to Texas Instruments, Inc. and the enactment of a statutory defini-
tion, cost or pricing data generally were considered to be verifiable factual
data only, not judgmental data. Now, however, to the extent judgments and
facts are inextricably bound together, or disclosure of judgmental data is
necessary to make factual data meaningful, disclosure of such judgmental
data will be required under the Truth in Negotiations Act. Although con-
tractors and the government will continue to argue over whether intertwined
judgments constitute cost or pricing data under the new statutory definition,
the continued blurring of the distinction between factual data and judgmen-
tal data clearly leaves contractors more vulnerable to defective pricing
charges than ever before.
81. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 446, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 657 (1987).
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Texas Instruments, Inc., ABSCA No. 23,678, 87-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 20,195,
at 102,268, 102,274, 102,276 (1987).
84. Id. at 102,271.
85. Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 20,717, 76-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 12,121, at 58,227
(1976); see also 48 C.F.R. § 15.801 (1987).
86. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(g) (Supp. IV 1986). The time of agreement on price has generally
been construed to mean the "shake-hands date" or completion of negotiations. Paceco Inc.,
ASBCA No. 16,458, 73-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,119 (1973); Aerojet-General Corp., ASBCA No.
12,873, 69-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 7585 (1969); see also 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-4(c) (1987).
87. 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-4(c) (1987); Conrac Corp., ASBCA No. 15,964, 74-1 B.C.A.
(CCH) 10,605, aff'd, Conrac Corp. v. United States, 558 F.2d 994 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
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C. Submission of Cost or Pricing Data
Contractors are required to submit cost or pricing data on Standard Form
1411, Contract Pricing Proposal Cover Sheet or in its attachments or refer-
enced documents.88 The FAR requires cost or pricing data to be "either
submitted or identified in writing by the time of agreement on price." 89
Merely making available books, records and other documents without iden-
tification does not constitute submission of cost or pricing data.90
Generally, in order to comply with data submission requirements, the
contractor must show that it: (1) furnished the data to authorized represent-
atives or auditors designated by the cognizant contracting officer; (2) identi-
fied the relevant data; and (3) made the data's significance known to the
government.9" The government assumes the burden of proving that it was
not clearly advised of the data and lacked actual knowledge thereof.92
Cost or pricing data must be submitted to the proper government officials.
Submission of data to a government representative not involved in the sub-
ject negotiation, or not designated by the appropriate contracting officer,
88. 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-6(b)(1) (1987) states:
Cost or pricing data shall be submitted on Standard Form 1411 (SF 1411), Contract
Pricing Proposal Cover Sheet, unless required to be submitted on one of the termina-
tion forms specified in Subpart 49.6. Data supporting forward pricing rate agree-
ments or final indirect cost proposals shall be submitted in a format acceptable to the
contracting officer.
89. 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-6(d) (1987) states:
(d) The requirement for submission of cost or pricing data is met if all cost or
pricing data reasonably available to the offeror are either submitted or identified in
writing by the time of agreement on price. However, there is a clear distinction
between submitting cost or pricing data and merely making available books, records,
and other documents without identification. The latter does not constitute "submis-
sion" of cost or pricing data.
90. The SF 1411, Instructions for Submission of a Contract Pricing Proposal, Table 15-2,
states in pertinent part:
3. There is a clear distinction between submitting cost or pricing data and merely
making available books, records, and other documents without identification. The
requirement for submission of cost or pricing data is met when all accurate cost or
pricing data reasonably available to the offeror have been submitted, either actually
or by specific identification, to the contracting officer or an authorized representative.
As later information comes into the offeror's possession, it should be promptly sub-
mitted to the contracting officer. The requirement for submission of cost or pricing
data continues up to the time of final agreement on price.
4. In submitting offeror's proposal, offeror must include an index, appropriately
referenced, of all the cost or pricing data and information accompanying or identified
in the proposal. In addition, any future additions and/or revisions, up to the date of
agreement on price, must be annotated on a supplemental index.
48 C.F.R. § 15.804-6(b)(2) (1987).
91. Id.
92. Texas Instruments Inc., ASBCA No. 23,678, 87-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,195 (1987).
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may not constitute proper submission.9 3 There is, however, no statutory or
regulatory scheme requiring the contractor to physically submit cost or pric-
ing data directly to the contracting officer or designated contract
negotiator.
94
Contractors also must clearly identify the data being submitted. Effective
disclosure requires that the government be clearly advised of the relevant
data or have actual, as opposed to imputed, knowledge of such data.95 Mak-
ing data available without proper ideitification is not meaningful disclo-
sure.96 For example, in M-R-S Manufacturing Co. v. United States,97 even
though a contractor's bill of materials was in error because the contractor
had submitted an outdated "card run" with the bill, a kardex file available to
the government auditor contained the accurate, updated information.
Although the government had access to the accurate, updated information,
the contractor neither physically delivered the kardex file to the government
nor advised the government that the kardex file contained accurate informa-
tion that should have been used to update the bill of materials.9" The court
held that making the kardex file available to the auditor without making its
significance known was not disclosure.99 Contractors are not required, how-
93. See, e.g., Singer Co., Librascope Div. v. United States, 576 F.2d 905 (Cl. Ct. 1978)
(data submitted to auditor relatively isolated from negotiations and preoccupied with other
tasks not meaningful submission); see also American Machine & Foundry Co., ASBCA No.
15037, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,409 (1973).
94. 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-1 (1987); see also Texas Instruments, Inc., ASBCA No. 23,678,
87-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,195 (1987). In Texas Instruments, Inc., the contractor delivered its
computer-generated "Run Cost 1" report to the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
before the government issued its Request For Quotations. Id. at 102,267. The contractor's
certification referred to the Run Cost I report, as did the pre-award audit. Id. The contrac-
tor's detailed job order cost reports and project account summaries were likewise delivered to
the auditor, and the pre-award audit and price analyst reports were provided to the govern-
ment's contract negotiator. Id. Also, the contractor's "Run Cost 2" report was submitted to a
DCAA auditor who participated in the contract negotiations. Id. These aggregate submis-
sions reasonably met the requirement of submission of data to the appropriate government
representatives. Id. at 102,276-77.
95. Sylvania Elec. Prods., ASBCA No. 13,622, 70-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 8387, at 38,999
(1970).
96. Id. (Physically handing over files that if examined would disclose differences between
proposed and historical costs without advising government of kind and content of the data is
insufficient.); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp., ASBCA No. 12,786, 69-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
7897 (1969); Plessey Indus., ASBCA No. 16,720, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,603 (1974); Hardie-
Tynes Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 10,717, 76-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 12,121 (1976).
97. 492 F.2d 835 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
98. Id. at 838.
99. Id. at 843; see also Singer Co., Librascope Div. v. United States, 576 F.2d 905 (Ct. Cl.
1978) (even though government auditor just conducted intensive study of data, no meaningful
submission where auditor not involved in negotiating contract); Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. United
States, 479 F.2d 1342 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (disclosure of data to ACO on other contracts for pur-
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ever, to generate additional data to analyze the relationship between the data
submitted and the contract proposal.tOo
The data submission requirement is fully satisfied if the government has
actual knowledge of the specific cost or pricing data.t'O As a general rule,
however, the government has no duty to seek out data, and contractors can-
not escape liability by showing that the government should have been aware
of the data. 10 2 Any doubt on this point has been removed by the 1986
poses not connected with the particular proposal, without request of forwarding to PCO on
contract at issue not submission); J.S. Latsis Group, ENG. BCA No. 4276, 86-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
18,853, at 95,017 (1985) (contractor's transmission of a lease "to unknown Government
representatives not shown to have been closely tied to administration of the contract, long
before the price negotiations in issue, commingled with other data, and not identified during
those negotiations, did not satisfy the submission requirements of the contracts defective pric-
ing provision"); Norris Indus., ASBCA No. 15,442, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) $ 10,482, at 49,547
(1974) (government under no duty to compare price proposals on two separate contracts to
find data errors).
100. Nevertheless, the ASBCA has come close to requiring contractors to explain the rela-
tionship in a few cases primarily dealing with questions of duplicative costs. Sylvania Elec.
Prods., 479 F.2d 1342 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co., ASBCA Nos. 20,367, 20,387,
76-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 11,827 (1976); American Machine & Foundry Co., ASBCA No. 15,037,
74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,409 (1974); Libby Welding Co., ASBCA No. 15,084, 73-1 B.C.A.
(CCH) 9859 (1973).
101. See, e.g., Norris Indus., ASBCA No. 15,442, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) $ 10,482 (1974);
McDonnell Douglas Corp., ASBCA No. 12,786, 69-2 B.C.A. (CCH) T 7897 (1969). More-
over, in FMC Corp., ASBCA No. 30,069, 87-1 B.C.A. (CCH) T 19,544 (1986), the board
implied that something less than actual knowledge may be sufficient to relieve the contractor of
liability. The contractor submitted a letter to the ACO at the agency's field office in the con-
tractor's plant. Id. at 98,755. The letter disclosed the contractor's latest revised labor and
indirect rates. Id. These rates were subsequently set forth in the contractor's Certificate of
Current Cost or Pricing Data which referred to the letter revision. Id. The board found the
government was not entitled to a reduction of contract price because:
[S]upplying the [data] to the ACO, who was not involved in [contract] negotiations,
was consistent with the [contractor's] past practice and with the ACO's requirement
that he receive and disburse new cost or pricing data; the officials negotiating for the
government were aware of these practices; the data were submitted for audit and
were clearly identified as new rate data; and accordingly, the government was aware
or should have been aware of the updated data.
Id. at 98,754; see also Whittaker Corp., ASBCA No. 17,267, 74-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,938, at
52,078 (1974) (early notice to government of some type of price reduction created a heavy
burden of proving that by the time of negotiation the government did not have information as
to new quotation). A limited duty to inquire on the part of the government was also implied in
Conrac Corp., ASBCA No. 19,507, 78-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 12,985 (1978) (post-price agreement
letter explicitly identifying quantity discount read but ignored by government which should
have inquired into connection between incomplete data and overstatement of contract price).
102. M-R-S Mfg. Co. v. United States, 492 F.2d 835 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Conrac Corp., ASBCA
No. 15,964, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,605, aff'd, Conrac Corp. v. United States, 558 F.2d 994
(Ct. Cl. 1977); Singer Co., Librascope Div. v. United States, 576 F.2d 905 (1978); Singer Co.,
Librascope Div., ASBCA No. 17,604, 75-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 11,401, aff'd on reconsideration,
Singer-General Precision, Inc., Librascope Div., ASBCA No. 17,604, 76-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
11,819 (1976).
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amendments to the Truth in Negotiations Act, which state, in pertinent part,
that it is "not a defense . . . that . . . the contracting officer should have
known that the cost and pricing data in issue were defective even though the
contractor ... took no affirmative action" to identify the data for the con-
tracting officer.
0 3
Finally, under certain circumstances the contractor must go beyond re-
quired physical submission and identification, and advise the government of
the "content of the cost or pricing data and their bearing on the prospective
contractor's proposal."" This requirement appears to center on whether
the significance of the data as submitted is "reasonably apparent" to the
government. 0 5 The majority of cases in which contractors were held liable
for failing to advise the government of the significance of submitted data
involved contractor concealment or misrepresentation of a fact in the con-
tract proposal that the government could have discovered only by a more or
less laborious review and comparison of the data and the proposal. 0 6 Thus,
contractors must not only follow specific requirements in the Act regarding
cost or pricing data submission but must also insure that the data is submit-
ted in a reasonably meaningful fashion.' 07 The judiciary has construed sub-
103. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
104. Sylvania Elec. Prods., ASBCA No. 13,622, 70-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 8387, at 38,999
(1970).
105. Grumman Aerospace Corp., ASBCA No. 27,476, 86-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 19,091
(1986); Plessey Indus., ASBCA No. 16,720, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,603 (1974).
106. Sylvania Elec. Prods., ASBCA No. 13,622, 70-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 8387 (1970); see also
Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co., ASBCA Nos. 20,367, 20,387, 76-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 11,827 (1976);
American Machine & Foundry Co., ASBCA No. 15,037, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,409 (1974);
Libby Welding Co., ASBCA No. 15,084, 73-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 9859 (1973). In Hardie-Tynes,
the contractor represented that it was company policy not to stock parts in inventory. ASBCA
Nos. 20,367, 20,387, 76-1 B.C.A. (CCH) T 11,827, at 56,477. A handwritten listing of parts
purchased over the previous years in the contractor's files suggested otherwise. Id. at 56,486.
The contractor did, in fact, carry some parts in inventory and subsequently used the inventory
parts in performance of the contract. Id. The ASBCA held that the contractor failed to meet
its data disclosure requirements, stating that:
in light of appellant's implicit representation that new purchases would be made of
the principal parts, and appellant's stated policy of not stocking parts, there was no
reason for the auditor to undertake the laborious task of checking the quantities
bought against the quantities required for previous contracts. In any event, a pro-
spective contractor does not meet its disclosure obligation merely by physically hand-
ing over data. It is also necessary that the Government representatives be advised of
the bearing that information has on the price proposal. The probability that appel-
lant had stock on hand was too obscurely revealed in the lengthy listing of previous
purchases to allow a prudent businessman to believe that it was not necessary to state
expressly that inventory which might be used on the contract was in existence.
Id. (citations omitted).
107. Plessey Indus., ASBCA No. 16,720, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) $ 10,603 (1974); Texas In-
struments Inc., ASBCA No. 23,678, 87-3 B.C.A. (CCH) T'20,195 (1987).
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mission duties rather strictly in interpreting the standards of meaningful
submission of data. 1
0 8
D. The Prima Facie Case of Defective Pricing
The government must establish the following elements to make out a
prima facie case of defective pricing under the Truth in Negotiations Act:
(1) the existence of an executed Certificate of Cost or Pricing Data in the
government's possession, or a procurement requiring submission of accurate,
current, and complete cost or pricing data pursuant to the Truth in Negotia-
tions Act; (2) government reliance on noncurrent, inaccurate, or incomplete
data in its negotiations with the contractor; and (3) an increase in the con-
tract price due to such reliance.
To establish the first element, the government must show that the contrac-
tor either executed a Certificate of Cost or Pricing Data or was required by
the Act to submit accurate, current, and complete cost or pricing data. 19
The certificate is the contractor's statement that the cost or pricing data sub-
mitted is accurate, complete, and current as of the date the agreement on
price is reached.'1 0 Prior to the 1986 amendments to the Act, there was
perhaps some question as to whether a contractor could be held liable for
defective pricing in the absence of such a certificate.'' Pursuant to the
amended Act, the absence of a certificate is no longer a defense to a charge of
defective pricing. The requirement for submission of accurate, current and
complete cost or pricing data is statutorily based and becomes operational as
a matter of law when the negotiated procurement or modification exceeds
$100,000 in the aggregate and is not subject to one of the cost or pricing data
exemptions discussed above.' 12
The second element the government must establish in a defective pricing
108. R. BOYD & D. AYLWARD, TRUTH IN NEGOTIATIONS (Government Contract Briefing
Paper 77-2) (2d ed. Apr. 1977). Disputes regarding submission of data generally have turned
upon the specific facts of each case.
109. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(d)(3)(D)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
110. Id. § 2306a(a)(3).
111. In Libby Welding Co., ASBCA No. 15,084, 73-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 9859 (1973), the
contract contained the required clause permitting a reduction in price in the event of defective
pricing. However, the contractor was not asked to and did not provide a Certificate of Current
Cost or Pricing Data for a contract modification in excess of $100,000. Id. at 46,076. The
government later asserted a defective pricing claim, but the ASBCA held that the claim was
precluded by the absence of a certificate. Id. at 46,092. The Board noted that the price reduc-
tion clause was tied directly to the certificate. Id. In its absence, the contractor was not liable
under the price reduction clause of the contract. Id.; see also Lockheed Shipbuilding & Const.
Co., ASBCA No. 16,494, 73-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,157, at 47,768-69 (1973).
112. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(d)(3)(D) (Supp. IV 1986).
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action under the Act is that it relied on the defective cost or pricing data." 3
The FAR establishes a rebuttable presumption that the government relied
on the defective data." 4 The presumption of reliance has been interpreted
as shifting the burden of going forward with the evidence to the contrac-
tor." 5 The contractor, however, may shift the burden back to the govern-
ment by introducing evidence of nonreliance. Once the contractor
introduces such evidence, the government then has the ultimate burden of
proving that it relied on the defective data."
16
Absent actual knowledge from other sources, the government is entitled to
rely solely upon a contractor's data." 7 However, the government's reliance
must be reasonable. The government may not refrain from analyzing the
contractor's proposal through the use of appropriate pricing, auditing, and
technical specialists. 1 8 Additionally, any time the contracting officer be-
comes aware of defective data, he or she is obliged to inform the contractor
immediately." 9 Thus, unreasonable government reliance may bar govern-
ment recovery for defective pricing.' 2 ° Similarly, if the contractor proves
that in the negotiations the government considered the defective data irrele-
113. Conrac Corp., ASBCA No. 15,964, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,605 (1974); American
Machine & Foundry Co., ASBCA No. 15,037, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,409 (1974).
114. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-7(b)(2) (1987); DOD FAR Supp. 15.804-7(b)(2) (1987).
115. See supra note 94.
116. In Sperry Univac Div., Sperry Rand Corp., DOT CAB No. 1144, 82-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
1 15,812 (1982), the contractor succeeded in rebutting the presumption that an overstated
contract price was the "natural and probable consequence" of inaccurate cost disclosure. The
contractor had breached its disclosure duty by failing to notify the Government in writing of
its arrangement to obtain a lower price from its subcontractor. Id. at 78,338-39. However, the
Board ruled that the Government was not thereby entitled to reduce the contract price, be-
cause the contractor was able to demonstrate that its final offer to the Government had, inter
alia, incorporated the inadequately disclosed savings on the subcontract. Id. at 78,339-40.
"[T]he record clearly shows that the contract price was the best which respondent would have
obtained even had it known the actual details of the subcontract pricing." Id. at 78,341; see
also Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 479 F.2d 1342, 1349 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
117. Norris Indus., ASBCA No. 15,442, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,482 (1974); Sylvania
Elec. Prods., ASBCA No. 13,622, 70-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 8387 (1970). Under certain circum-
stances, even if the government has actual knowledge of data other than that submitted, it may
be entitled to rely solely on the contractor's data and representations. Aerojet-General Corp.
v. United States, No. 298-74 (Ct. Cl. Nov. 12, 1976).
118. 48 C.F.R. § 15.805-1(b), (a) (1987).
119. Id. § 15.804-7(a).
120. Boeing Co., ASBCA No. 20,875, 85-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 18,351 (1985) (unjustified au-
ditor's conclusions regarding data partly prevented government from carrying its burden of
reliance); Conrac Corp., ASBCA No. 19,507, 78-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 12,985 (1978) (reasonable
consideration of the facts should have led Navy to realize that discount was being used); Levin-
son Steel Co., ASBCA No. 16,520, 73-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,116 (1973); Sparton Corp.,
ASBCA No. 11,363; 67-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 6539 at 30,379 (1967) (government may not
"choose one bit of defective data and close its eyes to other data and evidence which may
represent the true state of the facts").
1988]
Catholic University Law Review
vant, the contractor may escape liability. 121
The third element the government must establish as part of its prima facie
case is that the submission of defective cost or pricing data caused the gov-
ernment to pay a higher contract price. The pre-FAR regulations created a
presumption that the natural and probable consequence of defective data
was an increase in the contract price. 1 22 Although this presumption was
deleted from the FAR, the Department of Defense regulations supplement-
ing the FAR (DFARS) and the case law maintain this rebuttable presump-
tion. 123 This presumption shifts the burden of going forward with the
evidence to the contractor. Once the contractor introduces its rebutting evi-
dence, the government then has the burden of proving that defective data
actually increased the contract price.
124
E. The Government's Recovery in a Case of Defective Pricing
If the government establishes a case of defective pricing by the contractor,
the government is entitled to a price reduction equal to the amount of the
contractor's cost overstatement plus the appropriate burden, profit, or fee.' 2 5
This rule of damages was clearly illustrated in Sylvania Electric Products,
Inc. 126 In Sylvania, the contractor failed to disclose certain low quotations
for six items of electronic equipment prior to agreement between the parties
on the contract price.' 2 7 In arriving at the price reduction due to the gov-
ernment, the ASBCA reduced the price of the six items of equipment by an
amount equal to the difference between the contractor's proposal price and
121. Muncie Gear Work, Inc., ASBCA No. 18,184, 75-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 11,380 (1975); E-
Systems, Inc., ASBCA No. 17,557, 74-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 10,782, motion for reconsideration
denied, 74-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,943 (1974); Sparton Corp., ASBCA No. 11,363, 67-2 B.C.A.
(CCH) 6539 (1967).
122. 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-5(a)(2) (1970); cf 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-7(c), (d) (1987) (no such pre-
sumption in new general Federal Acquisition Regulations); Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. United
States, 479 F.2d 1342 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Aerojet-General Corp., ASBCA No. 12,264, 69-1 B.C.A.
(CCH) 7664, aff'd on reconsideration, 70-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 8140 (1970).
123. See DOD FAR Supp. 15.804-7 (1987); Aerojet-General Corp., ASBCA No. 12,264,
70-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 8140 (1970).
124. Lear Siegler, Inc., ASBCA No. 20,040, 78-1 B.C.A. (CCH) T 13,110 (1978); Shirk &
Greenberg, supra note 1, at 319, 328-29; see also Universal Restoration v. United States, 298
F.2d 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
125. 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-7(b) (1987); see also 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(d) (Supp. IV 1986). But
see Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. United States, 549 F.2d 767 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (where the Court
arrived at a compromise price adjustment under a theory analogous to comparative
negligence).
126. ASBCA No. 13,622, 70-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 8387 (1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1342 (Ct. Cl.
1973).
127. Id. at 38,999.
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the low quotation plus the appropriate overhead and profit.12 The cost
overstatements for all six items of equipment totalled $202,808.00 and, with
the negotiated 6% for overhead and 11.6% for profit, the total price reduc-
tion equaled $239,913.75.
The case law and the DFARS establish the presumption that the natural
and probable consequence of defective data is to increase the contract price
in the amount of the cost overstatement plus related overhead, profit, or fee.
Thus, a contractor may be liable for a dollar-for-dollar reduction of its con-
tract price based on the cost discrepancy between overstated cost data sub-
mitted to the government and corresponding undisclosed actual costs.
1 29
The presumption of an increased contract price may be overcome if the con-
tractor demonstrates that, even if it had disclosed the correct data, the par-
ties would not have negotiated a price that would have reflected the total
amount of the overstatement. By reconstructing the course of its previous
price negotiations with the government, the contractor can meet its burden
of going forward with evidence to rebut the presumption of a price
increase. 130
Additionally, a contractor may escape liability entirely by proving that
during the pricing negotiations for an acceleration order the government
weighed the impact of the defective data and reduced the price adjustment
accordingly.13 1 Prior to recent amendments, a contractor might rebut the
presumption that its nondisclosure of actual overhead rates resulted in in-
creased prices by proving that in negotiations it would have accepted no less
than its standard mark-up, from which it never waivered.
13 2
Where the dollar-for-dollar reduction formula is too unreliable or specula-
tive, alternative formulas may be used. In S. T Research Corp., 13 3 the con-
tractor's total estimated labor costs were inflated to cover the manufacturing
cost of certain contract items. The contractor subsequently purchased the
128. Id.
129. E.g., Aerojet-General Corp., ASBCA No. 12,264, 69-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 7664 (1969),
aff'd on reconsideration 70-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 8140 (1970).
130. See Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1306, 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1969);
Muncie Gear Works, Inc., ASBCA No. 18,184, 75-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 11,380 (1975). In Kisco
Co., ASBCA No. 18,432, 76-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 12,147 (1976), the contractor avoided liability
altogether by establishing that the parties considered the impact of the defective data and
reduced the price adjustment of an acceleration order accordingly.
131. Kisco Co., ASBCA No. 18,432, 76-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 12,147 (1976).
132. E.g., Universal Restoration, Inc. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1400, 1406 (Fed. Cir.
1986). But see 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1986) (no defense that contractor, due to
superior bargaining position, would not have changed price if accurate cost or pricing data had
been submitted).
133. ASBCA No. 29,070, 84-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 17,568 (1984).
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items without disclosing the data to the government. 134 Although the gov-
ernment sought a reduction based on the total proposed labor costs minus
the actual labor costs, the ASBCA held that this method was too unreliable
because (1) it simply assumed that the difference between actual total labor
costs was attributable to the items purchased rather than manufactured, and
(2) it did not account for efficiency gains, personnel turnover and other fac-
tors. '35 The ASBCA determined that a more reliable measure of recovery
was the difference between a postcontract estimate of the amount of esti-
mated labor hours attributable to the purchased items and the actual
purchase price of the items.136
In certain circumstances, a contractor may offset understatements of costs
in defective cost or pricing data against overstatements of costs, thereby fur-
ther reducing its liability for defective pricing. In other words, its liability
can be reduced by the amount that other defective data decreased the con-
tract price. 137 To obtain a set-off, the contractor must certify that to the best
of its knowledge and belief it is entitled to the set-off.' 38 It also must prove
that the data upon which the set-off is based were available before the date of
agreement on contract price but were not submitted as required by the Truth
in Negotiations Act. 139 Set-offs are permitted only up to the amount of the
government's claim in a single pricing action." The set-off cost, however,
need not be part of the same cost category (e.g. material, direct labor, or
indirect costs) that forms the basis for the government's price reduction.'
Set-offs are not permitted if the contractor knowingly submitted a false cer-
tificate of cost or pricing data,'42 or if the government proves that the price
would not have been increased as a result of the submission of the data upon
which the set-off is based. 113
In the past, contractors reduced or avoided defective pricing liability by
establishing that: (1) there was no agreement on line item prices because the
contract was negotiated on a "total cost" basis;' (2) the contractor was the
134. Id. at 87,547.
135. Id. at 87,548.
136. Id.
137. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(d)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1986); 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-7(b)(3) (1987); see
Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1306, 1309-12 (Ct. CI. 1969).
138. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(d)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1986).
139. Id. § 2306a(d)(4)(A)(ii).
140. 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-7(b)(3) (1987).
141. Id.
142. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(d)(4)(B)(i).
143. Id. § 2306a(d)(4)(B)(ii).
144. Bell & Howell Co., ASBCA No. 11,999, 68-1 B.C.A. (CCH) $ 6993 (1968) (board
split defective pricing proportionally according to relation between final price and parties' ini-
tial negotiating objectives, giving effect to total price negotiations).
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sole source for the procurement or otherwise was in a superior bargaining
position vis-a-vis the government;14 or (3) the contracting officer "should
have known" that the data were defective even though the contractor did
not affirmatively so inform the government. 4 6 These defenses, along with
the defense of absence of a Certificate of Cost or Pricing Data, are no longer
available to contractors, having been specifically removed by the 1986
amendments to the Truth in Negotiations Act.'
4 7
The amended Truth in Negotiations Act also provides that contractors
doing business with the DoD will be liable for interest on any contract over-
payment resulting from defective pricing.'4 8 Furthermore, if a defense con-
tractor knowingly submits defective data, the government may now impose a
separate civil penalty in the amount of the contract overpayment.
49
II. CIVIL FRAUD LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRICING
A. The Civil False Claims Statute
The DoD Inspector General considers defective pricing to be an "indica-
tor of fraud," and defective pricing is one of the principal sources of fraud
allegations against government contractors today.15 0 In this regard, the civil
false claims statute 15 is the government's primary civil litigative tool for
combatting fraud in government procurement, including defective pricing
fraud.
The current civil false claims statute is an outgrowth of the original False
Claims Act, adopted in 1863 as a result of investigations of the fraudulent
use of government funds during the Civil War.' 52 Contemporary debates
suggest that the False Claims Act was intended to reach all types of fraud,
without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the govern-
ment. 15' Originally, the False Claims Act provided for both civil and crimi-
nal penalties assessed against one who was found knowingly to have
submitted a false claim to the government.' 54 The civil penalty provided for
payment of double the amount of damages suffered by the government as a
145. American Machine & Foundry Co., ASBCA No. 15,037, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,409
(1974).
146. Norris Indus., ASBCA No. 15,442, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,482 (1974).
147. 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1986); 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-7(b)(3) (1988).
148. i § 2306a(e)(1)(A).
149. Id. § 2306a(e).
150. See supra text accompanying note 26.
151. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
152. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
153. See Shirk & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 331.
154. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, §§ 2, 3, 12 Stat. 696.
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result of the false claim, plus a $2,000 penalty for each claim submitted.' 5 5
The original False Claims Act remained in effect, practically unchanged,
until 1986. In 1982, the civil provisions of the False Claims Act were recodi-
fled in the civil statute at section 3729 of title 31 of the United States
Code.' 5 6 The recodification made no substantive changes in the civil provi-
sions, but merely substituted simple language for awkward and obsolete
terms. 157
Through the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986,158 Congress practi-
cally rewrote the civil false claims statute "[i]n order to make the statute a
more useful tool against fraud in modern times."' 59 The Senate report on
the amendments stressed that the growing magnitude and pervasiveness of
government procurement fraud necessitated "modernization of the govern-
ment's primary litigative tool for combatting fraud; the False Claims
Act."'
160
To this end, the 1986 amendments to the civil false claims statute signifi-
cantly increase recoverable damages, raise civil forfeiture penalties, eliminate
the need to prove specific intent to defraud, reduce the government's burden
of proof, and permit and facilitate "qui tam" actions against contractors by
private citizens.
16 1
1. The Amended Civil False Claims Statute Expands Civil Liability for
the Knowing Submission of a False Claim to a Government
Agency-The Prima Facie Case
As amended, the civil false claims statute imposes civil liability on any
person who presents a false or fraudulent claim to the government. 162 To
establish a prima facie violation of the statute, the government must prove
155. Id. § 3.
156. Act of Sept. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 872, 978 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. 3729 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
157. See H.R. REP. No. 651, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1895, 1895. For further details of the early legislative and statutory history of
the False Claims Act, see United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968); Rainwater
v. United States, 356 U.S. 590 (1958); Annotation, Specific Intent to Defraud Government as
Necessary to Impose Liability Under Provisions ofFalse Claims Act (31 U.S. C. § 231) Pertaining
to "Fake" or "Fictitious" Claims as Statements, 26 A.L.R. FED. 307, 310-11 (1976).
158. Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as amended 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (Supp. IV
1986)).
159. See S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5266, 5266.
160. Id.
161. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (Supp. IV 1986).
162. The full text of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (Supp. IV 1986) prohibits seven types of conduct.
For our purposes, we need focus only on the prohibition set out in the text; for reasons dis-
cussed in part IV, it encompasses a case of defective pricing.
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by a preponderance of the evidence16 that: (1) there was a presentation of a
claim to a government agency; (2) the claim was false; and (3) the party
submitted the claim knowing it to be false or with deliberate ignorance or
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity."64 Significantly, because the courts
have construed the statute to permit recovery of the statutory minimum pen-
alty without proving actual damages,"' a violation of the statute often oc-
curs upon the mere submission of a false claim. Government reliance on the
false claim is not an essential element.
1 66
The civil false claims statute, as amended, significantly expands contrac-
tors' liability for submission of false claims to the government. Prior to
amendment, the statute did not define the term "claim." The Supreme
Court, however, filled this void by holding that a "claim" encompassed all
attempts to cause the government to pay out sums of money. 1 67  The
amended statute not only encompasses all direct and indirect attempts to
cause the government to pay out sums of money, but also encompasses "re-
verse false claims," meaning false claims to avoid payment of money to the
government. 1
6 8
163. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
164. See id. § 3729.
165. United States v. Rohleder, 157 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1946) (permitting recovery of
$2000 under the pre-1986 amendment to the False Claims Act). Under the 1986 amendments
the government may recover a minimum of $5000, up to $10,000, plus three times the amount
of actual damages the government sustains. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
166. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
167. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968).
168. Section 3729(a) states in pertinent part that liability under the Act attaches if any
person:
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the
United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record of state-
ment to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government;
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim
allowed or paid;
(4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used,
by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government or willfully to conceal
the property, delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than the amount for
which the person receives a certificate or receipt;
(5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property used,
or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government, makes
or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the information on the re-
ceipt is true;
(6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public prop-
erty from an officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed
Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge the property; or
(7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or state-
19881
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Prior to amendment, the statute did not expressly define the nature of the
intent required for a violation of the false claims statute. Judicial authority
was split on the element of intent. 6 9 Some courts held that liability de-
pended upon a showing of specific intent to defraud the government, 170
while other courts required only a knowing submission of a false claim.' 7'
The amended statute significantly expands contractor liability for civil false
claims by eliminating the specific intent requirement. The element of intent
is now satisfied by proof of a "knowing" submission, defined as either (1) ac-
tual knowledge of falsity, or (2) deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of
the truth or falsity of the claim.1 72 The amended statute specifically states
that proof of specific intent to defraud is not required. 173
Before its amendment, the statute did not specifically address the govern-
ment's burden of proof in a civil false claims action. Some judicial authority
required the government to carry a heavier burden than ordinary preponder-
ance of the evidence, demanding instead "clear and convincing," or "clear,
explicit and unequivocal" proof. 174 The amended statute, however, requires
only that the government "prove all essential elements of the cause of action,
including damages, by a preponderance of the evidence."' 175
ment to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or prop-
erty to the Government.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (Supp. IV 1986). Section 3729(c) states that:
For purposes of this action, "claim" includes any request or demand, whether under
a contract or otherwise, for money or property which is made to a contractor,
grantee, or other recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of
the money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government will
reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money
or property which is requested or demanded.
Id. § 3729(c). However, section 3729(e) states that the Act "does not apply to claims.., made
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954." Id. § 3729(e).
169. See generally Shirk & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 333-34.
170. Id.
171. Specific intent required by: United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 122 (9th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310, 315 (6th Cir. 1962); United States v. Priola, 272 F.2d
589, 594 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v. National Wholesalers, 236 F.2d 944, 950 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1956); United States v. Schmidt, 204 F. Supp. 540, 543-44 (E.D.
Wis. 1962).
Knowing submission required by: Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509,
527 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 1032
(1967); Fleming v. United States, 336 F.2d 475, 480 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 907
(1965); United States v. Fox Lake State Bank, 225 F. Supp. 723, 725 (N.D. II. 1963); United
States v. Children's Shelter, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 865, 866 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
172. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 123 (9th Cir. 1970).
175. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
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United States v. JT Construction Co. 176 aptly illustrates the application of
the civil false claims statute elements and the burden of proof in a defective
pricing situation."77 In JT Construction, the contractor submitted subcon-
tractor price quotes with its cost or pricing data in a proposal for a negoti-
ated construction contract with the Army.' 7 8 After awarding the contract,
the Army began to suspect that some of the submitted subcontractor price
quotes had been inflated by the contractor in order to gain a higher contract
price.' 79 Following an investigation, the government brought criminal and
civil false claims actions against the contractor.' 80 Subsequently, the con-
tractor was acquitted of the criminal charges and moved for summary judg-
ment in the civil action, arguing that a jury could not reasonably find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the contractor had the requisite intent
required for recovery under the civil false claims statute.18'
The court noted first that the government's false claims action was based
on a violation of the Truth in Negotiations Act.182 Thus, the government
had the burden of proving that the subcontractor price quotes were "cost or
pricing data" within the meaning of the Truth in Negotiations Act, that the
contractor failed to disclose these data as required by the Act, and that the
contractor acted "willfully and with guilty intent."' 83 Based upon the ver-
dict in the criminal case and the fruits of discovery in the civil action, the
contractor contended that the government would be unable to sustain its
burden as a matter of law.' 84 The court found this argument unpersuasive.
The court noted that in the criminal case the government had the burden of
proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt, not by a preponderance of the
evidence.' 8 ' The judge in the criminal case found that the government
presented sufficient evidence of the contractor's intent to permit the case to
go to the jury. ' 86 Because the civil action required only that the government
prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence, and genuine issues of
material fact existed, the court denied the contractor's summary judgment
176. 668 F. Supp. 592 (W.D. Tex. 1987).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 593.
179. Id.
180. Id.; United States v. DiBona, 614 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (criminal case).
181. JT Constr. Co., 668 F. Supp. at 593.
182. Id.
183. Id. Here the district court improperly defined the intent requirement as "willfully and
with guilty intent," citing a pre-amendment case, United States v., Aerodex, 469 F.2d 1003,
1007 (5th Cir. 1972) inapplicable to the amended statute, which requires only a showing of a
"knowing" submission.
184. JT Constr. Co., 668 F. Supp. at 593.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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motion. 187
The relationship between the civil false claims statute and criminal false
claims or false statements in a defective pricing context is well illustrated in
United States v. DiBona. 18 The defense contractor in DiBona certified that
the cost or pricing data submitted with its proposal, which included data on
historical hours worked, were accurate, complete and current.18 9 In fact,
the contractor had inflated the actual number of hours worked. 90 The con-
tractor and its two principals were indicted and charged with three counts of
violating the criminal false statements statute.1 91 In a plea agreement, the
two principals pleaded guilty and the government charges against the con-
tractor were withdrawn.1 92 Subsequently, the government commenced a
civil false claims action against the same three defendants. 93 The govern-
ment moved for partial summary judgment on the theory that the defend-
ants were collaterally estopped from denying their liability under the civil
false claims statute because of the guilty pleas in the antecedent criminal
false statements proceeding. 94 The defendants argued that because their
convictions were for false statements and the civil action was for false claims,
collateral estoppel was improper."
The court held that defendants were estopped on the issue of liability for
civil false claims on the basis of the principals' criminal convictions because
the "false statement and the false claim [were] two sides of the same coin,
issues which [arose] out of the same core of operative facts."' 196 The court
further held that collateral estoppel applied not only to the principals who
pled guilty but also to the contractor corporation under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior.197 The court stated that although the corporate entity
was not convicted on criminal charges, it could not "deny its liability after
its top officers, acting through the corporation, admitted to violations of the
False Claims Act."' 198
The consequence of reducing both the state of mind required to prove a
false claim and the government's burden of proof in the context of contract
187. Id. at 594.
188. 614 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
189. Id. at 41.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 43.
197. Id. at 44.
198. Id.
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pricing, is expanded contractor liability for fraud. Moreover, it has to some
extent blurred the distinctions between pricing that is defective under the
Truth in Negotiations Act and pricing that is fraudulent under the civil false
claims statute.
2. Government Recovery under the Civil False Claims Statute
The 1986 amendments to the civil false claims statute not only expand the
scope of contractors' liability for submission of false claims, but also signifi-
cantly increase the damages and civil penalties the government may recover
under the statute. Prior to the statute's amendment, the government could
recover double its actual damages, a $2,000 penalty per false claim, and the
costs of the suit.' 99 The amended statute permits the government to recover
triple its actual damages,"° a $5,000-$10,000 penalty for each false claim,2'
and the costs of the suit.202
A contractor may, however, reduce its liability to double actual damages
plus penalty and costs. To do so, it must prove: (1) that the contractor
disclosed to government officials "responsible for investigating false claims
violations" all knowledge regarding the violation "within 30 days after the
date on which the [contractor] first obtained the information; '2 0 3 (2) the
contractor fully cooperated with any government investigation of the viola-
tion;2" and (3) that "no criminal prosecution, civil action, or administrative
action had commenced ...with respect to such violation" and that the
contractor did not have actual knowledge of an investigation when disclo-
sure was made to the government.20 5
Damages for violation of the civil false claims statute generally are calcu-
lated as the difference between the amount the government actually paid in
reliance on the false claims and the amount it would have paid had the con-
199. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982). The Supreme Court held that damages under the pre-
amendment statute were intended to "afford the Government complete indemnity for the inju-
ries done it." United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943). The Court ruled
that "the chief purpose of the statutes here was to provide for restitution to the government of
money taken from it by fraud, and that the device of double damages plus a specific sum was
chosen to make sure that the government would be completely whole." Id. at 551-52; see also
United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976). It is difficult to justify the steeply increased
penalties and damages in the amended statute on the grounds that they are necessary to assure
restitution. An award of triple damages plus penalties is obviously punitive in nature.
200. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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tractor been truthful. 20 6 Unlike the Truth in Negotiations Act,2 0 7 there is
no presumption of entitlement to damages aiding the government under the
civil false claims statute.20 8 The government must carry the burden of prov-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence what it would have paid absent the
fraud.20 9 To meet its burden of proof the government must show that the
claimed damages are, in the language of the statute, "because of" the com-
mission of the fraudulent act.210 The government must establish direct
causal connection between the government's losses and the contractor's
fraudulent conduct.21' Accordingly, consequential damages are not recover-
able under the statute because they are not directly caused by the submission
of false claims.212
In false claims cases founded on misrepresentation of cost estimates or
cost data, damages are based on the amount that the contractor actually
overcharged the government as a result of the misrepresentation.213 In these
cases, as in defective pricing cases under the Truth in Negotiations Act,
overstatement of costs eliminated in price negotiations are deducted from
the total amount of the overstatement to arrive at actual damages." 4
In addition to actual damages, the civil false claims statute entitles the
government to a forfeiture for each false claim submitted.215 The amended
statute increases the penalty from $2,000 to a range of $5,000 to $10,000 per
false claim.216 Since the forfeiture or penalty continues to be primarily puni-
tive in nature, forfeiture liability is imposed on the contractor whether or not
206. Brown v. United States, 524 F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1975); United States v. Woodbury, 359
F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1966); see also Shirk & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 335-36.
207. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
208. The government's failure to meet its burden of proof under § 3729 may relieve the
contractor from paying anything more than nominal damages, and may even relieve it from
paying any damages at all. See United States v. Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 94 F. Supp. 493
(D.R.I. 1950) (court assessed double nominal damages plus allowed the government to recover
the $2,000 forfeiture on each of the 105 false claims the contractor submitted); see also Little v.
United States, 152 F. Supp. 84 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
209. Brown v. United States, 524 F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1975); United States v. Sawin, 243 F.
Supp. 744 (S.D. Iowa 1965); United States v. MacMurtrie, 206 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
210. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
211. United States v. Hibbs, 568 F.2d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 1977). The causation requirement
"should be liberally construed" to provide the government restitution but should not be disre-
garded completely. Id.
212. United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1011 (5th Cir. 1972).
213. The rule is the same for misrepresentation of actual costs. See United States v. Ueber,
299 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1962).
214. United States v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 316 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on
other grounds, 447 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Shirk & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 336-
37.
215. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
216. Id.
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liability for actual damages attaches.21 7
In determining the number of imposable forfeitures for violations of the
statute, the Supreme Court has held that the number of forfeitures "has gen-
erally been set at the number of individual false payment demands that the
contractor has made upon the government., 21 8 A contractor may not be
assessed forfeitures, however, for false payment demands over which it had
no knowledge and control.2 19
B. The Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986-
The "Mini False Claims Act"
A new weapon in the fight against federal procurement fraud was created
by congressional passage of the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of
1986.220 This legislation was passed in conjunction with the comprehensive
amendments to the civil false claims statute and provides a new administra-
tive remedy for smaller fraud cases that the Department of Justice declines
to litigate. The Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act establishes new adminis-
trative procedures, including a hearing with due process and discovery
rights.2 21 The jurisdiction of this statute encompasses claims, or statements,
or groups of related claims submitted simultaneously, which amount to
$150,000 or less.22 2
The administrative procedures set forth in the Program Fraud Civil Rem-
edies Act are novel in some respects. Each government agency is responsible
for setting up its own program and is required to propose rules to implement
the statute.22 3 Furthermore, each agency must appoint investigating officials
and reviewing officials to implement its program.2 24
The investigating official of the relevant federal agency is given authority
to investigate contract fraud allegations under the Program Fraud Civil
Remedies Act and to report findings and conclusions to the agency's "re-
viewing official."' 22 ' The reviewing official, after determining that "adequate
evidence" of contractor liability exists, must give written notice to the Attor-
ney General of his or her intention to refer the action for prosecution under
217. See Shirk & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 337.
218. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, at 309 (1976); see also Fleming v. United
States, 336 F.2d 475, 480 (10th Cir. 1964).
219. Bornstein, 423 U.S. at 312; see also Shirk & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 337-39.
220. Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1934 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3812 (Supp. IV
1986)).
221. 31 U.S.C. § 3803(d), (e) (Supp. IV 1986).
222. Id. § 3803.
223. Id. § 3803(g)(2).
224. Id. § 3801(a)(4), (7)-(8).
225. Id. § 3803(a)(1).
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the statute.226 Upon written approval of the action by the Attorney General,
a presiding officer of the agency must conduct a hearing on the case pursuant
to the statute and procedural regulations promulgated by the agency.22 7
After completion of the hearing, the presiding officer must issue a written
decision, based on the preponderance of the evidence,2 28 including findings
of fact and conclusions of law.2 2 9 The contractor may appeal the decision to
the agency head within thirty days of issuance. 23° Additionally, the contrac-
tor may seek judicial review of the agency head's decision in the appropriate
United States district court.231  This review is not de novo. The agency
head's determination will not be overturned unless the court finds it is "un-
supported by substantial evidence."' 23 2 The district court's judgment is final
and unreviewable.
2 33
1. Prima Facie Case
The prima facie case of liability under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies
Act is similar to that under the civil false claims statute. There are two
actions available to the government-one for false claims and one for false
statements. A prima facie case of false claims requires a showing that the
contractor submitted a claim,2 34 and knew or had reason to know the claim
was false, fictitious, or fraudulent. 235 A claim is false, fictitious, or fraudu-
lent if it is supported by a written statement asserting a false or fraudulent
material fact, omits a material fact which the contractor had a duty to dis-
close, or demands payment for items not provided as claimed.23 6
A prima facie case of a false statement requires a showing that the con-
tractor presented a written statement to the government, the contractor
knew or had reason to know the statement was false, fictitious, or fraudulent,
and the statement contained or was accompanied by an express certification
226. Id. § 3803(a)(2).
227. Id. § 3803(a), (d), (g)(1).
228. Id. § 3803(f).
229. Id. § 3803(h).
230. Id.
231. Id. § 3805.
232. Id. § 3805(c). The statute states in pertinent part that "[iln concluding whether the
... determinations are found by the court to be unsupported by substantial evidence, the court
shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due accounts shall be
taken of the rule of prejudicial error." Id.
233. Id. § 3805(e). This is a highly unusual provision and it remains to be seen whether it
will withstand constitutional scrutiny if challenged.
234. A "claim" is any request, demand, or submission to a federal government authority
for property, services, or money. Id. § 3801(a)(3).
235. Id. § 3802(a)(1).
236. Id.
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or affirmation of its truthfulness and accuracy. 37 A false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement is one asserting a material fact that is false or fraudu-
lent, or one omitting a material fact that the contractor had a duty to dis-
close and that renders the statement containing the omission false or
fraudulent.23
The Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act requires proof of precisely the
same state of mind on the part of the contractor as does the civil false claims
statute-"actual knowledge that the claim or statement is false," or deliber-
ate ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the claim or
statement.239 The Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act does not require the
government to prove specific intent to defraud.2" ° Nor does it require reli-
ance by the government on the false statement or claim, or proof of
damages.241
Essentially, the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act fills the role of the
civil false claims statute in cases where a small dollar amount is at issue and
the Justice Department declines to prosecute. As with the civil false claims
statute, a contractor who escapes liability for defective pricing under the
Truth in Negotiations Act because the government did not rely on the defec-
tive data may nevertheless be liable for false claims or false statements under
the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act, which does not require proof of
reliance by the government on the false claims or statements.242
2. Government Recovery under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act
Under of the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act, the government may
recover a penalty of "not more than $5,000" for each false statement.243
There is no provision for actual damages for false statements under the stat-
ute. For each false claim, the government may recover up to a $5,000 pen-
alty plus, "in lieu of damages," an assessment of up to twice the amount of
the claim or portion thereof determined to be in violation of section 3802.24
The "damages" assessment may only be recovered if payment of the claim
has been made by the government. 24' The presiding officer, however, has no
jurisdiction over allegations of liability under the Program Fraud Civil Rem-
237. Id. § 3802(a)(2).
238. Id.
239. Id. § 3801(a)(5).
240. Id.
241. Id. § 3801.
242. Id. § 3802.
243. Id. § 3802(a)(2).
244. Id. § 3802(a)(1).
245. Id. § 3802(a)(3).
1988]
Catholic University Law Review
edies Act if the value of the claim at issue exceeds $150,000.246 For purposes
of application of the statute's penalties, "each voucher, invoice, claim form,
or other individual request or demand" is a separate claim.24 7 Likewise,
"each written representation, certification, or affirmation" constitutes a sepa-
rate statement.248
Government recovery of penalties and assessments for false claims or false
statements under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act is "in addition to
any other remedy that may be prescribed by law.",249 Furthermore, the gov-
ernment is specifically authorized to collect penalties and assessments im-
posed under the statute by administratively offsetting the amount against
any funds owed by the government to the contractor. 250 Neither suspension
nor debarment will automatically result from an adverse determination
under the statute, however, because liability under the statute is not "consid-
ered as a conclusive determination of... responsibility pursuant to Federal
procurement laws and regulations.",25 1
III. CRIMINAL FRAUD LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRICING
The stepped-up war against waste, fraud, and abuse in government pro-
curement has resulted in increased criminal as well as civil fraud investiga-
tions. Contract pricing is one of the areas in which the government has
concentrated its criminal fraud investigation efforts. The primary vehicles
for prosecution of procurement fraud have been the criminal false state-
ments21 2 and criminal false claims 253 statutes. Although these statutes are
not new,254 the criminal penalties for violations of both statutes increased
dramatically as a result of passage of the amended Comprehensive Crime
246. Id. § 3803(c)(1). The statute appears to leave open the potential for splitting cases
involving related claims submitted at different times, e.g., progress payments. Id.
247. Id. § 3801(b).
248. Id. § 3801(c).
249. Id. § 3802(a)(1). A determination that a contractor may be liable under § 3802 may
provide the government with "grounds for commencing any administrative or contractual ac-
tion against [the contractor] which is authorized by law and which is in addition to any action
... under this chapter." Id. § 3802(b)(1).
250. Id. § 3807.
251. Id. § 3802(b)(3). Although neither suspension nor debarment is an automatic result
of an adverse determination under this statute, it seems probable that such a determination
could stimulate the government agency to insitute an inquiry regarding the contractor's pres-
ent responsibility which could, in turn, lead to suspension or debarment from government
contracting.
252. 18 U.S.C § 1001 (Supp. IV 1986).
253. Id. § 287.
254. The Criminal False Statements Act was originally enacted in 1948. Act of June 25,
1948, Pub. L. No. 772, 62 Stat. 749.
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Control Act of 1984,255 which includes the first comprehensive sentencing
law for the federal criminal system.256 The comprehensive sentencing law
includes a provision substantially raising, and making uniform, maximum
fines for federal crimes including false claims and false statements.257
Although the government has made use of other criminal statutes, such as
those governing conspiracy2 58 and mail and wire fraud,2 59 in its campaign
255. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C.).
256. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1995, amended by Sen-
tencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1266 (1987) (current version at 18
U.S.C.A. § 3571 (West Supp. 1988)).
257. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3571 (as amended).
258. A contractor may be charged with a violation of the conspiracy statute on the grounds
that submitted claims or certifications are part of a contractor's scheme to defraud the govern-
ment by inducing the government to pay an inflated contract price.
Government contractors have been convicted of conspiracy to file false statements, make
false claims and defraud the government under the conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
See United States v. White, 765 F.2d 1469 (1 1th Cir. 1985). Section 371 of the United States
Code encompasses two specific crimes, conspiracy to violate a substantive provision of the
federal criminal code, and conspiracy to defraud the United States, both of which may be
applicable in a defective pricing scenario. 18 U.S.C. § 371. The elements of a conspiracy
consist of (1) an agreement by two or more persons; (2) to commit a criminal offense or de-
fraud the United States; (3) with knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy as well as inten-
tional and actual participation in the conspiracy; and (4) one or more of the conspirators
performing an overt act in furtherance of the illegal goal. See United States v. Falcone, 311
U.S. 205, 210-11 (1940); United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1189 (8th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Pintar, 630 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Skillman, 442
F.2d 542, 547 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971).
Proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy by one of the conspirators is generally
required under § 371. United States v. Everett, 692 F.2d 596 (9th Cir, 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1051 (1983); United States v. Kupper, 693 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Conlon, 481 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1979); see also Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216
(1946).
The submission of defective cost or pricing data or subsequent submission of claims for
payment may be viewed as overt acts in furtherance of a scheme to make false claims or
otherwise defraud the United States into paying an inflated contract price. See, e.g., White,
765 F.2d at 1482.
259. A contractor who transmits a false or fraudulent contract claim or certification of cost
or pricing data by mail or wire may be criminally liable under the mail fraud or wire fraud
statutes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The mail fraud statute is a
favorite weapon of prosecutors for two reasons; the relative ease with which a violation can be
factually established and the ease with which multiple convictions can be obtained for basically
the same conduct. Mail fraud requires proof of a higher standard of intent than do false
statements.
The elements of mail fraud that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are:
(1) the existence of a scheme or artifice intended to defraud another; and (2) use of the United
States mails in furtherance of the execution of such a scheme. See Pereira v. United States, 347
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954); United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1568-69 (1lth Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); Pritchard v. United States, 386 F.2d 760, 764 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1004 (1968); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1125,
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against procurement fraud, a favored statute for the prosecution of procure-
ment fraud is the false statements statute because its elements are generally
the easiest to prove in a contract pricing or other procurement fraud
scenario. 2 °
It is important to recognize that the criminal sanctions of the false state-
ments and false claims statutes extend to the corporate entity as well as to
corporate employees.2 6' Corporate liability is determined by focusing on the
activities of corporate employees. Corporate liability will be imposed if the
corporation's employees, while engaged in the unlawful conduct, were acting
within the scope of their authority and for the purpose of benefiting the cor-
poration.26 2 Furthermore, under the collective knowledge doctrine, criminal
liability may be imposed on the corporate entity even if no liability attaches
to any corporate employees.2 63
A. The Criminal False Statements Statute-The Prima Facie Case
The criminal false statements statute, section 1001 of Title 18 of the
United States Code, penalizes any person who knowingly and willfully sub-
mits false, material statements to the government concerning a matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States. 26
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any depart-
ment or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsi-
fies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ments or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.26 5
1134 (E.D. Va. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1105 (1983). The elements of a wire fraud violation are virtually identical to those of mail
fraud but the wire fraud act applies to use of "wire, radio, or television communication in
interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
260. Overly, Government Contractors, Beware.: Civil and Criminal Penalties Abound for
Defective Pricing, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 597, 612 (1987).
261. See, e.g., United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1288 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Empire Packing
Co., 174 F.2d 16, 20 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949).
262. Hanger One, 563 F.2d at 1158; Wagner Iron Works v. United States, 174 F. Supp.
956, 958 (Ct. Cl. 1959); see also 10 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATION § 4886, at 393 (rev. perm. ed. 1986) (corporate liability even where agent acted
solely for own benefit).
263. See infra notes 318-32 and accompanying text.
264. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
265. Id. There are three distinct criminal offenses in § 1001. The first clause imposes lia-
bility for the knowing falsification, concealment or covering up by trick, scheme, or device of a
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To sustain a conviction under section 1001, the government must prove
five elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the submission of a statement;
(2) the submitted statement was intended to bear a relation to some matter
within the jurisdiction of a federal agency or department; (3) the statement
was material; (4) the statement was false; and (5) the party willfully submit-
ted the statement knowing it to be false.266
The first element the government must prove is the submission of a "state-
ment." This term has been interpreted to include practically any writing.26 7
Moreover, the term has also been construed to include oral statements.2 68
Second, the government must establish that the statement relates to some
matter within the jurisdiction of a federal department or agency. Signifi-
cantly, the government need not prove that the party submitting the false
statement actually presented it to a federal agency,269 or had actual knowl-
edge of federal agency jurisdiction.27 °
The third element the government must prove in a section 1001 prosecu-
tion is that the submitted false statement was "material., 27 ' Although the
requirement of materiality explicitly applies only to the "trick, scheme, or
device" clause of section 1001, there is a dispute between the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and other federal circuit courts over
whether materiality is an essential element of proof in cases covered by the
"false statements" clause of the statute. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has steadfastly held that materiality of false state-
material fact; the third imposes liability for making or using any false document or writing.
Id. We limit our analysis to the second, more commonly applied "false statement" clause,
although as will become apparent in Part IV, arguably any of the clauses could apply to a case
of defective pricing.
266. Although § 1001 does not specifically proscribe omissions, if an omission resulted in a
false representation it would fall within the purview of the criminal false statements statute.
United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 676 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982);
United States v. McCarthy, 422 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 398 U.S. 946 (1970).
267. United States v. Godwin, 566 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1978) (government successfully pros-
ecuted individual for submitting false time sheets to a U.S. Marshal); Ebeling v. United States,
248 F.2d 429 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957) (contractor's submission of false
statement of costs to government satisfied "statement" requirement).
268. United States v. Adler, 380 F.2d 917, 922 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006 (1967).
269. United States v. Dick, 744 F.2d 546, 554 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Shirk & Greenberg,
supra note 1, at 342.
270. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984).
271. Unlike the criminal false statements statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982); supra text
accompanying note 264, the criminal false claims statute does not explicitly state that material-
ity is an element of the offense. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 287 (Supp. IV 1986); infra text accompanying
note 300. Some courts have indicated that because the two statutes have a similar purpose,
materiality is also an essential element of the false claims statements. See, e.g., Adler, 623 F.2d
at 1291 n.5; United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 652 n.12 (4th Cir. 1974). Contra United
States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 682 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
19881
Catholic University Law Review
ments is not a necessary element for guilt.27 2 Other federal circuit courts
addressing the issue have inferred a judicially created limitation of "materi-
ality" '2 73 for the purpose of excluding trivial falsehoods from the purview of
the statute.27 4 In these circuits, the test of materiality is whether the state-
ment is capable of affecting or influencing the exercise of a government func-
tion, but the government need not actually be influenced by the statement.275
The "materiality" requirement of section 1001 can be satisfied even if the
false statement was not relied upon by the government, did not actually
deceive the government, 276 or did not cause the government any pecuniary
loss. 2 77
To establish the intent element of section 1001, the government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willfully submitted the
statement with the knowledge that it was false. 278 "Willful" means only that
the forbidden act was done deliberately and with knowledge. 279 A statement
is made "knowingly" if it is made with knowledge or awareness of the true
facts. 280 The government, however, need not prove that the false statement
272. United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Aadal, 368 F.2d
962 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Marchisio, 344 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v.
Silver, 235 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 880 (1956).
273. United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1975); see also United States v.
Dick, 744 F.2d 546 (7th cir. 1984); United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d 1359 (1 1th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); United States v. Johnson, 530 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Deep, 497 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Cooper, 493 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. Cole, 469 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1972); Brethauer v. United States, 333
F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1964); Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 878 (1961); Freidus v. United States, 223 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
274. United States v. White, 765 F.2d 1469 (11 th Cir. 1985).
275. United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907
(1980); see also Gonzales, 286 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 878 (1961).
The test applied is whether the statement "has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable
of influencing, the decision of the tribunal in making a determination required to be made. Id.
(quoting Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956)).
276. Blake v. United States, 323 F.2d 245, 247 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Coastal
Contracting & Eng'g Co., 174 F. Supp. 474, 479-80 (D. Md. 1959).
277. United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941); United States v. Krause, 507 F.2d
113, 117 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Jones, 464 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1972).
278. United States v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498 (11th Cir. 1982); Lichenstein, 610 F.2d at
1276.
279. United States v. Carrier, 654 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1981) (willful act does not require an
evil intent, only that the it is done deliberately and with knowledge); United States v. Smith,
523 F.2d 771 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1975). At least one court has held that an
indictment for making false claims on a government contract is insufficient if it fails to allege
that the contractor acted willfully. United States v. Cook, 586 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 442 U.S. 909 (1978).
280. United States v. Doshard, 666 F.2d 498 (11 th Cir. 1982); United States v. Carrier, 654
F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1976); Elbel v.
United States, 364 F.2d 127, 134 (10th Cir. 1966).
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was made with intent to defraud281 or with "specific intent" to deceive the
federal government.282
The courts appear to be easing the scienter requirement for a section 1001
conviction. Courts which had established as a required element of a section
1001 violation proof of a knowing, willful submission with intent to deceive
have held that intent to deceive may be inferred from a reckless disregard for
the truth with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.283 Eliminat-
ing the actual knowledge requirement would appear to be inconsistent with
the stated requirement of an intent to deceive.
At least one court apparently has recognized this inconsistency and no
longer requires a proof of intent to deceive. 284 In United States v. White,
2 5
the defendants were convicted of various charges, including filing of false
statements with respect to negotiated change orders on a National Air and
Space Administration (NASA) contract. 286 The defendants had submitted a
"cost proposal" for the change orders, attaching supporting documents that
included a document entitled Estimate Summary For Change Orders.
287
That document included a detailed cost breakdown specifying the number of
labor hours devoted to each change order and additional charges for equip-
ment expenses.2 8 The defendants submitted a Certificate of Cost or Pricing
Data with its supporting documents. 289 At the negotiation, the defendants
281. United States v. White, 765 F.2d 1469 (11th Cir. 1985); Nilson Van & Storage Co. v.
Marsh, 755 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Godwin, 566 F.2d at 975 (5th Cir.
1978); see also United States v. Johnson, 284 F. Supp. 273 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd, 410 F.2d 38 (8th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 822 (1969) (18 U.S.C. § 1001 does not require that the gov-
ernment prove a specific intent to defraud).
282. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 73 (1984).
283. See White, 765 F.2d at 1481-82; United States v. Schaffer, 600 F.2d 1120, 1121-22 (5th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1015 (1978); United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 280-81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821
(1973); United States v. Egenberg, 441 F.2d 441, 444 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994
(1971); see also United States v. Petullo, 709 F.2d 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 454 (7th Cir. 1980) (the contractor did not sign or execute a document or
know one would be filed, but the court found it foreseeable by the contractor that the principal
would deceive the United States Custom Service).
284. United States v. Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1986). In holding that § 1001 re-
quires no intent to deceive, Vaughn relied on the Supreme Court case of United States v.
Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 73 (1984), which stated that Congress did not intend § 1001 to require
"specific intent to deceive the Federal Government." Yermian, 468 U.S. at 73. It is unclear,
however, whether Yermian still requires an intent to deceive as opposed to the specific intent to
deceive the Government.
285. 765 F.2d 1469 (11th Cir. 1985).
286. Id. at 1482.
287. Id. at 1472.
288. Id. at 1473.
289. Id.
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represented that the itemized expenses were not estimates, but "hard dollar
hours" and actual costs.2 9° The defendants were aware that proposal costs
were significantly inflated compared to actual costs.2 9 1 Moreover, submis-
sions to NASA deleted all formulas and factors used to derive the cost pro-
posals, and although the defendants represented to NASA that the figures
had a basis in their records and they would supply those records to NASA,
they failed to do SO.292
On appeal, the defendants contended that their submissions to NASA
were merely estimates presented to the government as an opening position in
the negotiations for the change order work and were represented as such.2 93
Consequently, according to the defendants, the key element of section
1001-the knowing submission of a false statement-was not met because
the proposals were estimates and judgments rather than facts, and as such
could not be knowingly falsified.29 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted that
the defendants certified their cost proposal data and had a legal obligation to
inform NASA of any formula or factoring methods used to arrive at the
proposed figures, which they had failed to do. 2 95 Furthermore, the defend-
ants had made specific representations that their submissions were based on
actual hours and that they had specific documentation to back up the figures
which was never forthcoming.29 6 On this evidence, the court noted that it
could' reasonably be found that the defendants' submission did not reflect
reasonably incurred expenses and constituted false statements that were
knowingly submitted as false. The court, in upholding defendant's convic-
tions, stated:
Even if [defendants'] estimates were truly based on mathematical
formula, appellants had a duty to make sure that they reflected
reasonably incurred costs. Checking available physical data on
change orders was the obvious means to accomplish this end. The
appellants' avowed failure to do so evidenced a reckless disregard
of the truth, with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.
Such action is sufficient to show that a false statement was made
knowingly or willfully.
2 97
Unlike a false claim, a false statement need not be a demand for money or
290. Id. at 1474.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1478.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1479.
296. Id. at 1481.
297. Id. at 1481-82.
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property in order to violate the false statements statute. Section 1001 is
broad enough to cover all false statements made by a contractor to support a
fraudulent claim for payment.29 8 Moreover, every false statement, even if
made pursuant to a single contract or scheme to defraud, is a separate viola-
tion of section 1001.299
B. The Criminal False Claims Statute-The Prima Facie Case
The amended criminal false claims statute, section 287 of title 18 of the
United States Code, imposes criminal liability on any person who presents a
false, fictitious, or fraudulent claim to the federal government.3"° Section
287 provides:
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil,
military, or naval service of the United States, or to any depart-
ment or agency thereof, any claim upon or against the United
States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim
to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not more
than five years and shall be subject to a fine in the amount provided
in this title.3 0 '
The 1986 amendments to the criminal false claims statute did not change
the substance of the statute.30 2 To sustain a conviction under section 287,
the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) a claim was
presented to a federal agency or department; (2) the claim was false, ficti-
tious or fraudulent; and (3) the defendant submitted the claim knowing it to
be false, fictitious or fraudulent.30 3
Apparently, the broad definition of "claim" as set forth in section 3729 of
the civil false claims statute304 applies to prosecutions under section 287 of
the criminal false claims statute,30 5 inasmuch as both sections evolved from
the same statutory scheme under the original False Claims Act. Thus, any
attempt to cause the government to part with its money constitutes a
298. United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1972).
299. See United States v. Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813 (D.N.J. 1957).
300. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (Supp. IV 1986).
301. Id.
302. Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3169 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 287 (Supp. IV
1986)), merely deleted the pre-amendment fine amount for violation of the statute.
303. United States v. Computer Science Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Va. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).
304. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
305. See United States v. Winchester, 407 F. Supp. 261, 272 (D. Del. 1975) (cases constru-
ing the civil branch of the False Claims Act are relevant to the interpretation of the criminal
branches of the False Claims Act); see also White Collar Crime: A Survey of the Law, 18 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 169, 281 (1980).
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"claim" for purposes of section 287.306 Each false demand for payment con-
stitutes a separate violation of section 287, even if multiple claims are made
pursuant to a single contract or are part of a single scheme to defraud.30 7
The government must establish the intent element of section 287 by prov-
ing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with knowledge that
its claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent.3" 8 There is confusion among the
courts as to the requisite intent that is needed to sustain a conviction under
section 287, and whether a higher standard of criminal culpability is re-
quired for a "fraudulent" claim as opposed to a "false" claim.309 Although
at least one court has required a specific intent to deceive,31 0 the consensus
suggests that a less specific state of mind is sufficient. Thus, knowledge of
falsity, intent to violate the law, or consciousness of wrongdoing have suf-
ficed to establish guilt under section 287.3 1  Furthermore, several courts
have held that knowledge can be inferred from a reckless disregard for the
truth of the claim combined with a conscious effort to avoid learning the
truth.3 12
Unlike the false statements statute, however, section 287 omits willfulness
as an element of the offense.3 13 The government is not required to prove a
306. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (Supp. IV 1986) defines "claim" as including:
any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or prop-
erty which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States
Government provides any portion of the money or property which is requested or
demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other
recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded.
Id.
307. United States v. Ehrlich, 643 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Brown, 524
F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Alsco-Harvard Fraud Litigation, 523 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1981).
308. Some courts define the requisite state of mind as "knowledge of falsity." See, e.g.,
United States v. Precision Medical Laboratories, 593 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1978). Other courts
require a specific intent to deceive which may be inferred from a finding that defendant knew
his claim was false. See, e.g., United States v. Rifen, 577 F.2d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 1978).
309. See generally White Collar Crime: A Survey of the Law, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 169,
285 (1980).
310. United States v. Martin, 772 F.2d 1442 (8th Cir. 1985).
311. United States v. Maher, 582 F.2d 842, 847 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115
(1979); accord United States v. White, 765 F.2d 1469 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Blecker, 657 F.2d 629 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1982) (intent to defraud not
required for conviction under § 287, government showing that defendant submitted invoices
with knowledge of their falsity is sufficient); United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.
1979).
312. See White, 765 F.2d at 1469; United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 821-22 (11th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985); United States v. Holloway, 731 F.2d 378, 380-81
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1021 (1984); United States v. Cook, 586 F.2d 572, 578-80 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979).
313. See White, 765 F.2d at 1472; United States v. Cook, 586 F.2d 572, 574-75 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979). But see United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231, 233
[Vol. 37:935
Defective Pricing of Government Contracts
specific intent to defraud. a 4 Nor does section 287 specifically require that
the false claim be material. Some courts have held that proof of materiality
is not required,3 ' 5 while others have concluded that materiality is a neces-
sary element of the false claim offense.3"6 Although section 287 requires
proof that a false claim was submitted to the government, there is no re-
quirement that the claim actually be honored by the government.
3 17
C. Corporate Criminal Liability for False Statements and False Claims
under the Collective Knowledge Theory
Recent developments in the law of corporate criminal liability may poten-
tially expand contractor criminal liability for defective pricing fraud. 1
Corporate criminal liability has always been derivative liability. As such,
"the acts and intent of corporate officers and agents are imputable to the
corporate entity." '3 19 Traditionally, in prosecutions for crimes requiring
knowledge or willfulness, such as false claims or false statements, corpora-
tions could be convicted only if at least one agent or employee acted with the
requisite knowledge or intent.320
Currently, however, there is growing momentum toward the establish-
ment of a doctrine of "collective knowledge" in corporate criminal law.32 '
Under the collective knowledge doctrine, "a corporation may be held liable
n.6 (9th Cir. 1979) (approving a jury instruction on knowing and willful element in indict-
ment); Maher, 582 F.2d at 846-47 (approving a jury instruction on willfulness).
314. See supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
315. See United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 822
(1984); United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 682 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016
(1982).
316. See United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1291 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 652 n.12 (4th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. United States, 410 F.2d 38, 46 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 822 (1969). Courts generally construe the term "materiality"
broadly because it is a matter of law rather than fact. United States v. Pruitt, 702 F.2d 152,
155 (8th Cir. 1983); see also White, 765 F.2d at 1473. The conflict between the courts seems
more apparent than real.
317. United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d 1293, 1302 (D.D.C. 1984).
318. See generally 1 CORP. CRIM. LIABILITY (1984).
319. Id. § 1.04, at 8. Where corporate employees or agents commit unlawful acts during
the course of employment and within the scope of their authority the liability for those culpa-
ble acts may be imputed to the corporation. Id. at 8-9. Furthermore, liability generally at-
taches to the corporation regardless of the agent's status in the corporate hierarchy and
regardless of whether the agent's conduct contravenes established or express corporate policy,
so long as the agent has been authorized to act on behalf of the corporation in the matter that
gave rise to the misconduct. Id. at 9. Finally, although corporate criminal liability is deriva-
tive of agent and employee misconduct, it is not contingent on the conviction of the wrongdo-
ing agent. Id. at 10.
320. Id.
321. See id. § 4.05, at 93-97.
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for knowing violations of the law notwithstanding the absence of proof that
any single agent intended to commit the offense or even knew of the exist-
ence of the operative facts that led to the violation." '22 Thus, even in the
absence of such proof, a corporation may be held liable for crimes requiring
a culpable mental state by imputing to the corporation the collective knowl-
edge of its employees and agents as a group.323
Prior to 1987, the collective knowledge doctrine was applied almost exclu-
sively within the context of criminal prosecutions for knowingly and will-
fully violating a false records prohibition in the Interstate Commerce Act.324
United States v. Bank of New England, N.A. 3 25 however, created a foothold
for the collective knowledge doctrine outside of this specialized regulatory
area. Accordingly, the doctrine is now on the threshold of becoming a rec-
ognized corporate criminal law doctrine.326
In Bank of New England, the bank was found guilty under the Currency
Transactions Reporting Act,327 of knowingly and willfully failing to file the
required Currency Transaction Reports (CTR) on cash withdrawals of more
than $10,000 by a single customer,328 even though two former head tellers of
the bank and the customer were acquitted of similar charges.329 On appeal,
one of the issues was whether the application of the collective knowledge
theory was proper in determining whether or not the bank knowingly and
willfully violated the CTR filing requirement.33° In upholding the jury in-
structions on collective knowledge and intent, the court of appeals noted
that a collective knowledge instruction is "entirely appropriate" in the con-
text of corporate criminal liability. 331 According to the court:
Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the ele-
ments of specific duties and operations into smaller components.
The aggregate of those components constitutes the corporation's
knowledge of a particular operation. It is irrelevant whether em-
ployees administering one component of an operation know the
specific activities of employees administering another aspect of the
operation .... 33
322. Id. at 93-94.
323. Id. at 94.
324. Id. at 94 n.38.
325. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
326. 1 CORP. CRIM. LIABILITY § 4.01 (1984).
327. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d at 848. The Currency Transaction Reporting Act is
codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (1982).
328. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d at 847.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 856.
331. Id.
332. Id.
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The court concluded that even though it was unclear whether any one bank
employee had acquired the requisite knowledge of the transactions, or the
applicable reporting requirements, the aggregate knowledge of the bank tell-
ers and managers could be imputed to the bank.333
The implications of the collective knowledge doctrine for government con-
tractors are significant. Although the collective knowledge doctrine has not
yet been adopted in the context of a criminal false statement or false claim
suit encompassing defective pricing, the knowledge requirements of section
1001 of the criminal false statements statute334 and section 287 of the crimi-
nal false claims statute3 5 are practically identical to the standard in the Cur-
rency Transactions Reporting Act under which the Bank of New England
case was decided. Thus, there is no logical reason for a court that has
adopted the collective knowledge doctrine not to apply it in the context of
criminal false statements and false claims.
If the collective knowledge doctrine were applied in a criminal false state-
ments case encompassing defective pricing, it might result in a corporate
contractor being held criminally liable for false statements if its certified cost
or pricing data are found to be noncurrent or incomplete, even though no
single employee knew that the data was defective, that it was submitted to
the government, and that it was required to be accurate, current, and com-
plete as of the date of agreement on price. In such a case, the facts would
not support the criminal conviction of any individual involved because no
one had the requisite knowledge of all the operative facts. Under the collec-
tive knowledge doctrine, however, the aggregate knowledge of all the em-
ployees could be sufficient to convict the corporate contractor of
"knowingly" submitting a false statement to the government. Thus, a corpo-
rate contractor must establish a single vigilant control point for clearing all
cost or pricing data submissions in order to reduce the potential for criminal
liability under the collective knowledge doctrine.
D. Criminal Penalties for Violation Of the Criminal False Statements and
False Claims Statutes
Penalties for criminal false statements and false claims have risen dramati-
cally in recent years, even as the requirements of intent necessary to sustain
conviction under these statutes appear to be eroding. Prior to late 1984, the
penalty for each conviction of a false claim or false statement was a fine of
333. Id.
334. See supra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 308-12 and accompanying text.
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not more than $10,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years.336 As part
of the current wave of criminal law reform, and in conjunction with the war
against procurement fraud, Congress has passed new legislation dramatically
increasing fines for the violation of criminal fraud and similar "white collar"
criminal statutes. One rationale for the huge increase in fines was the belief
that existing penalties were insubstantial and therefore lacked any deterrent
effect, especially since a corporation can not be sent to jail.337
Accordingly, as part of the first comprehensive federal sentencing law, 338
fines for the violation of the criminal false statement and false claims statutes
were increased to a maximum of $250,000 for a violation by individuals and
$500,000 for a violation by corporations. 339 Defense contractors are subject
to fines of up to $1,000,000 per violation. 3 '° There is a limit, however, on
multiple fines to be imposed on a defendant for multiple offenses arising out
of a common scheme or plan that "do not cause separable or distinguishable
kinds of harm or damage. ,311 In such cases, the maximum monetary fine is
twice the amount imposed for the most serious offense.342 Furthermore,
under the new federal sentencing guidelines promulgated pursuant to the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,343 imposition of these fines will be
mandatory and may be commensurate with any loss or damage to the gov-
ernment caused by the criminal violations. 3"
336. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982); see also 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982).
337. See H.R. REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 106, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182.
The need for such increased penalties is particularly apparent with regard to a corpo-
rate defendant which today can often divide the minor burden of payment among its
many stockholders, or pass it on to consumers as a cost of doing business, with the
result that lesser penalties may not be felt either by the corporation or by its multiple
owners.
Id. at 3289.
338. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1995, amended by Sen-
tencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, 101 Stat. 1266 and Criminal Fine Improvements
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-85, 101 Stat. 1279 (currently codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3571-3581
(West Supp. 1988)).
339. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3571 (West Supp. 1988). In 1985, Congress extended the penalty limit
provided under tit. 18, § 287 to $1,000,000 if the false statement or claim was made to the
Department of Defense. Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
145, § 931, 99 Stat. 699 (currently set out as a note to 18 U.S.C. § 287 (Supp. IV 1986).
340. 18 U.S.C. § 287 note (Supp. IV 1986).
341. Id.
342. Thus, if a defense contractor is convicted of two or more counts of false claims and
false statements "that arise from a common scheme or plan" the maximum fine imposable for
the aggregate violations is $2,000,000. Id.
343. See supra note 338.
344. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3571(d) (West Supp. 1988). In lieu of, or in addition to the crimi-
nal fines, individuals convicted under criminal fraud statutes may be sentenced to prison for up
to five years. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3551, 3559 (West Supp. 1988).
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IV. APPLICATION OF ANALYSIS TO A HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM
In this section, we explore the government contractors' increased liability
for defective pricing under the Truth in Negotiations Act, the civil false
claims statute, and the criminal false statement and false claims statutes in
the context of a hypothetical example. At the same time, we explore the
interrelationship among these statutes. A chart illustrating the relationship
among the statutes is found in the Appendix to this article.
A. Hypothetical
Megga Corporation, a conglomerate that includes a number of defense
related divisions and affiliates, was awarded a defense contract by the United
States Navy for fifty XYZ airborne antisubmarine warfare radar systems and
certain spare parts. The Navy had previously awarded Megga a contract for
development models of the precursor to the XYZ radar system. Subse-
quently, the Navy awarded two production contracts for the radar system to
Megga. The current award is the third production contract. The contract
called for delivery of fifteen radar systems six months after the contract
award, another twenty radar systems nine months after the award, and the
remaining fifteen radar systems one year after the award. Once the radar
systems were delivered, Megga was to supply a certain amount of spare parts
to the Navy. The contract was a negotiated defense contract subject to the
requirements of the Truth in Negotiations Act.
The XYZ radar system was composed of four boxes, identified as a black
box, a red box, a green box, and a white box. The black and white boxes
were manufactured by the Fuzzbuster Division of Megga Corporation. The
green and red boxes were supplied to Megga by an outside vendor. The
boxes were integrated by Megga and the completed radar systems delivered
to the Navy for installation.
As part of Megga's pricing proposal for the supply of the radar systems,
Megga submitted its cost figures, which consisted of estimated and historical
labor hours, material costs, and vendor quotations, on Standard Form 1411
(SF 1411). With respect to the spare parts, the government negotiators in-
formed Megga that the price for the parts would be based solely on the his-
torical costs of spare parts delivered in the previous two production
contracts. As part of Megga's pricing proposal for the spare parts, Megga
submitted on its SF 1411 computer generated cost runs representing the his-
torical costs of spare parts from the previous two production contracts.
Megga and the government negotiators reached agreement on price. Megga
then executed a Cost or Pricing Certificate certifying the accuracy, com-
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pleteness, and currency of its cost or pricing data as of the date the agree-
ment was reached.
Megga delivered the fifty radar systems according to schedule. Each of
the three deliveries was accompanied by Form DD-250 invoicing the gov-
ernment at prices based on previously submitted cost or pricing data. Megga
also successfully completed its spare parts delivery obligations and submitted
one invoice to the government on Form DD-250 for the spare parts.
Six months after Megga delivered the last of the spare parts, the DCAA
conducted a routine defective pricing audit. The audit revealed that Megga
realized on its Navy contract a profit of twenty-five percent on cost as com-
pared to an estimated profit shown on its SF 1411 of ten percent on cost.
The auditors discovered that Megga's Vice-President for Contract Negotia-
tions had knowingly overstated Megga's vendor quotations on the red and
green boxes by approximately twenty percent before submitting those quota-
tions to the government. It was also discovered that Megga's accounting
department had knowingly failed to disclose the latest historical labor hour
data available for certain components of the black and white boxes and that
the estimated labor hours contained on Megga's SF 1411 and supporting
schedules for those components were twenty-five percent higher than the
historical labor hours. The audit further concluded that Megga overstated
its price for the spare parts by failing to submit its latest computer run cost
report revealing the decreasing costs of manufacturing the spare parts during
the latter part of the second production contract. Apparently responsible
Megga personnel neglected to obtain the latest computer run cost from
Megga's accounting department during the contract negotiations. The in-
vestigation concluded that, as a result of Megga's activities, the federal gov-
ernment was overcharged for costs in the amount of $1 million.
B. Analysis of the Hypothetical
1. Truth in Negotiations Act
The facts of the hypothetical case reveal that Megga Corporation manipu-
lated and withheld cost or pricing data from the government, the effect of
which was to enable Megga to realize a significant profit on its Navy con-
tract. These facts appear to make out a prima facie case of defective pricing
under the Truth in Negotiations Act.
First, in connection with the negotiation of its nonexempt government
contract, Megga Corporation executed a Certificate of Cost or Pricing Data
when it reached agreement on price with the government. 34 1 Under the
345. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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amended Truth in Negotiations Act, however, even if a certificate had not
been submitted to the government, Megga would still be liable for inaccu-
rate, incomplete, or noncurrent data submitted under the Navy contract.346
Second, the latest historical labor hour data available for components of
the black and white boxes was clearly cost or pricing data as defined by the
amended Act.34 7 Accordingly, they should have been disclosed to the gov-
ernment during price negotiations. The data consisted of verifiable historical
labor costs, facts "which prudent buyers and sellers would reasonably expect
to have a significant effect on price negotiation." 348 Even if government
auditors had obtained this information while auditing the previous radar sys-
tem production contract, unless the government negotiators had actual
knowledge of the data, or Megga Corporation alerted the government nego-
tiators to the significance of the data for this procurement, Megga failed to
meet its submission requirements under the Act.34 9 Moreover, as a result of
Megga's overstated vendor quotations, failure to submit historical labor
hour data on black and white box components, and failure to submit its
latest computer run cost report for spare parts, the information submitted on
SF 1411 was inaccurate and noncurrent. Thus, the information did not sat-
isfy the requirement under the Truth in Negotiations Act that cost or pricing
data be accurate, complete and current.35° In short, Megga Corporation's
cost or pricing data were defective.
Third, in price negotiations, the government relied on Megga's defective
data.3 ' Fourth, the government's reliance thereupon resulted in the govern-
ment paying higher prices for the radar systems and spare parts.
352
Turning to the question of damages under the amended Truth in Negotia-
tions Act, the government is entitled to a price reduction equal to $1 million,
the amount of Megga's cost overstatement, plus the appropriate overhead
and profit.353 To the extent that Megga can show that even if it had dis-
closed correct data, the parties would not have negotiated a price reduced by
the total amount of overstatement, 354 or that it understated certain of its
contractual costs, the government's recovery will be reduced accordingly.355
On the other hand, if the government can show that Megga intentionally
346. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
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misrepresented its cost or pricing data Megga would be liable for double
damages or in excess of $2 million. 356
2. The Civil False Claims Statute
Megga's submission of defective cost or pricing data on the Navy contract,
and its certification of the data in conjunction with its subsequent submission
of invoices to the government on Form DD-250, also appear to establish a
prima facie violation of the newly amended civil false claims statute, 31
U.S.C. § 3729. 357 First, the combination of these actions falls within the
expanded definition of "claims" under section 3729, as it constitutes an at-
tempt by Megga to cause the government to pay out sums of money. 58
Second, Megga's claims were false: the Forms DD-250 invoiced the gov-
ernment for inflated prices based on inaccurate cost data.359
Third, Megga acted with the apparent requisite "state of mind." Our hy-
pothetical facts suggest that Megga knowingly submitted the false claims, or
at the very least, that Megga submitted the claims with deliberate ignorance
of their truth or falsity. Prior to the amendment of section 3729 of the civil
false claims statute, this would not have been sufficient to make out a prima
facie case in those jurisdictions that required a showing of specific intent to
defraud. 360 Furthermore, some courts previously required that the govern-
ment prove its case by clear and convincing evidence.3 61 Under the
amended section 3729, however, the government need only prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that Megga knowingly submitted the false
claims, or submitted the claims with deliberate ignorance of their truth or
falsity. 362
As a result of Megga's actions, the government may recover under
amended section 3729 triple its actual damages, a $5,000-$10,000 forfeiture
for each false claim, and its costs of suit.363 Megga's damages payment will
be reduced to double actual damages if it proves that it disclosed the viola-
tion to the government thirty days after first learning of it, and that it fully
cooperated with the government's investigation.3 6' Like the computation of
damages under the Truth in Negotiations Act, actual damages under section
3729 of the civil false claims statute are computed by determining the
356. See supra note 149 and accompany text.
357. See supra note 162-66 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 172, 175, and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
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amount of the cost overstatement due to the false data, subtracting amounts
eliminated during negotiations, and then adding appropriate burden and
profit. 6 Thus, assuming Megga's cost overstatement was not reduced in
any amount during price negotiations, it appears that Megga would be liable
for a sum exceeding $3 million in actual damages, that is, a sum treble $1
million in costs plus appropriate overhead and profit. Prior to the amend-
ment of section 3729, Megga would have been liable for a sum exceeding $2
million, i.e., a sum double the $1 million in costs, plus appropriate overhead
and profit.
With respect to Megga's liability for penalties, the number of imposable
penalties is generally set at the number of individual false payment demands
over which the contractor had knowledge and control.366 Moreover, the
government cannot recover more than one penalty for the same false claim.
The application of these rules to our hypothetical case requires an assess-
ment of four forfeitures or $20,000-$40,000, on the basis of the four Forms
DD-250 Megga used in invoicing the government. Prior to the amendment
of section 3729, Megga would have been liable for only $8,000 in penalties,
or $2,000 for each invoice.36 7 If Megga Corporation's false claims amounted
to $150,000 or less, the government would have the option of seeking recov-
ery under the administrative procedures of the Program Fraud Civil Reme-
dies Act with virtually the same proof requirements as under the civil false
claims statute.36 8
3. The Criminal False Statement and False Claims Statutes
The hypothetical facts also appear to make out a prima facie violation of
the criminal false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001. First, the SF 1411,
the Certificate, and the Forms DD-250 are all "statements" under section
1001, inasmuch as each document is a written representation to the govern-
ment of Megga's cost or pricing data, the accuracy of that data, or the prices
ultimately based on that data.369 Second, the statements relate to matters
within the jurisdiction of a government agency as all were made to the Navy
as part of that agency's procedure for the pricing and payment of govern-
365. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 234-51 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text. Arguably the Forms DD-250 them-
selves are not false statements because they merely reflect the prices in the actual contract.
Nevertheless, in conjunction with the SF 1411 and certificate, the forms probably violate the
first clause of § 1001, which imposes liability for the knowing falsification, concealment or
covering up by trick, scheme or device of a material fact. See supra note 265.
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ment contracts. 37" Third, for the reasons noted above, all of the statements
were false.37'
Fourth, the statements were "material" within the meaning of section
1001 of the criminal false statements statute.3 72 The submission of defective
cost or pricing data and its subsequent certification resulted in a higher con-
tract price. Even if Megga's false statements did not cause an increase in the
contract price, they arguably were material because they had "a natural ten-
dency to influence, or [were] capable of influencing" the government's deci-
sionmaking process.3 73 Moreover, Megga's invoices to the government on
the Forms DD-250 were material because they sought payment of sums that
Megga had no right to collect.
Fifth, the intent element of section 1001 appears to be satisfied. The in-
flated cost figures and nondisclosure of material data suggest that Megga
willfully or deliberately made the statements knowing they were false.3 74
Even if Megga did not have actual knowledge of the statements' falsity, the
intent requirement is met if Megga made the statements with reckless disre-
gard for their truthfulness.3 75
Likewise, the hypothetical facts appear to make out a prima facie violation
of the criminal false claims statute, 18 U.S.C. § 287. First, the invoices to
the government on Forms DD-250 demanding payment based on a defec-
tively priced contract are claims within the meaning of the statute.3 76 Sec-
ond, for the reasons already set forth in our discussion of section 3729
liability under the civil false claims statute, the Forms DD-250 were all
false.377
Finally, the intent element of section 287 of the criminal false claims stat-
ute appears to be satisfied. Megga's awareness of inflated cost figures and
nondisclosure of material data suggest that Megga acted with knowledge of
the falsity of its claims when it submitted the Forms DD-250.378 The
chances of a conviction of Megga for criminal false statements or false
claims in some jurisdictions are perhaps increased by the apparent elimina-
tion of the requirement that the government prove actual knowledge of a
false submission in such cases.379
370. See supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
371. See supra text accompanying note 259.
372. See supra notes 272-77 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 304-07 and accompanying text.
377. See supra text accompanying note 359.
378. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 283-84, 311, and accompanying text.
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A fine would almost certainly be imposed on Megga if it were convicted of
violating the false statements or false claims statutes. Because the violations
involved a defense contract, the maximum fine imposable on the corporation
for each false statement or claim would be $1 million. 8 However, since the
false statements and claims arise out of a common scheme or plan, Megga's
maximum criminal liability for conviction of two or more counts of false
statements or claims would be double the maximum fine for a single viola-
tion, or $2 million.3"'
Thus, in the hypothetical example, the same acts that establish defective
pricing under the amended Truth in Negotiations Act also help establish
liability under the amended civil false claims statute and criminal false state-
ments and false claims statutes. However, not all violations of the Truth in
Negotiations Act constitute violations of the false claims and false state-
ments statutes. The government may successfully pursue a government con-
tractor for defective pricing under the Truth in Negotiations Act, but be
unsuccessful in prosecuting the contractor for the same actions under the
civil and criminal false claims and false statements statutes and vice versa.
For example, suppose that the government's price negotiations memo-
randa reveal that the government never relied on Megga's inflated cost or
pricing data because Megga's offered price was lower than the low end of the
Navy's projected reasonable contract price range. In other words, the Navy
enthusiastically accepted the offer without relying on the cost information in
Megga's proposal. Under these circumstances, the government's defective
pricing action under the Truth in Negotiations Act would be defeated be-
cause the government would be unable to show that it relied on Megga's
defective cost or pricing data in negotiating the contract price, and that such
reliance resulted in a higher contract price.382 However, the government's
actions under the false claims and false statements statutes would not be
defeated because these statutes do not require either government reliance on
the false claims or statements or a showing of damages sustained as a result
of reliance. 3 3 Thus, under the civil false claims statutes, even if the govern-
ment suffered no damages, it could recover the $20,000-$40,000 penalty
from Megga.3 s4 Furthermore, Megga could be criminally liable for fines up
to $2 million under section 1001 of the criminal false statements statute and
380. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 113-24 and accompanying text. It should be noted here that, as a
general rule, government price negotiation memoranda specifically state at the outset that the
government negotiator relied on the contractor's cost or pricing data submission.
383. See supra notes 164, 266, 303, and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
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section 287 of the criminal false claims statute.38 5
Now, let us modify the intent element of our hypothetical example. Sup-
pose that Megga's inflated cost data resulted from a failure to disclose cer-
tain vendor quotations for the green and red boxes because of Megga's belief
that the quotations were inaccurate, unreasonably low, and, therefore, unre-
liable for pricing purposes, combined with an inadvertent error in the trans-
posing of figures from its work sheets to its pricing proposal, resulting in an
overstatement of its cost or pricing data.
Under these circumstances, Megga Corporation would still be held liable
under the Truth in Negotiations Act for any overstatement in contract price
caused by the submission of defective cost or pricing data. The fact that
Megga had honorable intentions and did not intentionally withhold cost or
pricing data from the government is irrelevant. The Truth in Negotiations
Act and the implementing regulations address the question of defects in the
data and not individual or corporate intent. 38 6 Any culpability or lack of it
on the part of Megga does not affect its obligation to refund the money.
Megga, however, may escape liability under the false claims and false
statements statutes. Before liability under the civil false claims statute could
be found, the government would have to prove that Megga knowingly
presented a false claim or statement to the government.3 87 Likewise, under
section 287 of the criminal false claims statute, the government would have
to establish that Megga submitted its claims knowing them to be false, ficti-
tious or fraudulent.38 8 Under the criminal false statements statute, the gov-
ernment would have to establish that a false statement was willfully or
deliberately submitted by Megga with the knowledge that it was false.3 89
The facts suggest that Megga believed the data was accurate and reliable,
that Megga inadvertently submitted defective data, and that Megga did not
submit the data with reckless disregard for, or in deliberate ignorance of, its
truth or falsity and, therefore, Megga did not have the requisite intent to
violate the false claims or false statements statutes.39 °
Let us modify our hypothetical example once more to present a disturbing
possibility with regard to corporate liability for defective pricing. Suppose
Megga's Vice President for Contract Negotiations requested an historical
385. See supra notes 338-41 and accompanying text.
386. However, under the amended Act, a defense contractor may be liable for an additional
civil penalty if it is found that the contractor knowingly submitted defective data. See supra
note 149 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 278-312 and accompanying text.
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cost analysis for the black and white boxes from the Fuzzbuster Division's
accounting department while neglecting to inform Fuzzbuster that the anal-
ysis would be submitted to the government as cost or pricing data in
Megga's latest proposal. The Fuzzbuster accounting department is very
busy and decides to give the Megga Vice President an analysis that was done
a few months before and that the accounting department knows is neither up
to date nor completely accurate but is generally representative of historic
costs for the boxes. The Megga Vice President subsequently submits the
cost analysis to the government without the knowledge that it is inaccurate
and noncurrent. Subsequently, the Navy relies on the defective data which
results in a higher contract price.
Under this scenario, Megga is liable for defective pricing under the Truth
in Negotiations Act. At first glance, however, it would appear that Megga
should not be liable for criminal false claims or statements because no single
agent or employee of Megga had the requisite knowledge or intent to submit
the false claims. Under the collective knowledge doctrine,"' however,
Megga may be held liable for a knowing violation of the false claims or false
statements statutes notwithstanding the absence of proof that any single em-
ployee intended to submit false claims or even knew of the operative facts
leading to the violation. Thus, the separate knowledge of both the
Fuzzbuster accounting department (that the black and white box cost analy-
sis was inaccurate and noncurrent) and the contract negotiator (that the cost
analysis was being submitted to the government and certified as accurate,
current, and complete) could be imputed collectively to Megga. Megga
would then be found to have knowingly submitted a false claim or statement
to the Navy, which could lead to Megga's conviction for criminal false
claims or statements.
V. CONCLUSION
The same acts establishing liability under the Truth in Negotiations Act
are increasingly giving rise to civil and criminal liability under the various
federal false claims and false statements statutes. Not all violations of the
Truth in Negotiations Act constitute violations of the false claims or false
statements statutes. A scienter requirement, establishing the intent of the
contractor to submit defective cost or pricing data to the government, must
be shown to establish liability for false claims or false statements but the
same element is not required to establish liability under the Truth in Negoti-
ations Act. Nevertheless, the line between Truth in Negotiations Act viola-
tions requiring no element of intent, and false claims or false statements
391. See supra notes 318-31 and accompanying text.
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violations requiring an element of intent has been blurred significantly.
False claims and false statements statutes which formerly required proof of
specific intent to defraud or actual knowledge of false submissions now
merely require proof of reckless disregard for or deliberate ignorance of the
truth or falsity of a claim or statement.
Furthermore, the potential application of the collective knowledge doc-
trine to criminal false claims and statements cases could, in effect, render
corporate contractors who submit defective data to the government, strictly
liable for criminal false claims or statements. Moreover, a contractor may
escape liability under the Truth in Negotiations Act, but still be found liable
under the false claims or false statements statutes. Thus, if the government
does not rely on defective cost or pricing data, or no price increase results
from submission of such data, the government is not entitled to a price re-
duction under the Truth in Negotiations Act. Nevertheless, neither reliance
nor actual damages are necessary to sustain civil liability or criminal convic-
tion under the false claims and false statements statutes.
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